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Ergative case and the transitive subject:
a view from Nez Perce
Amy Rose Deal
March 22, 2009
Abstract Ergative case, the special case of transitive subjects, raises questions not
only for the theory of case but also for theories of subjecthood and transitivity. This
paper analyzes the case system of Nez Perce, a ”three-way ergative” language, with
an eye towards a formalization of the category of transitive subject. I show that it is
object agreement that is determinative of transitivity, and hence of ergative case, in
Nez Perce. I further show that the transitivity condition on ergative case must be cou-
pled with a criterion of subjecthood that makes reference to participation in subject
agreement,not just to origin in a high argument-structuralposition. These two results
suggest a formalization of the transitive subject as that argument uniquely accessing
bothhighandlowagreementinformation,the formerthroughits (agreement-derived)
connection with T and the latter through its origin in the speciﬁer of a head associ-
ated with object agreement (v). In view of these ﬁndings, I argue that ergative case
morphology should be analyzed not as the expression of a syntactic primitive but as
the morphologicalspell-outof subject agreementand objectagreementon a nominal.
Keywords Nez Perce· ergativity·transitivity· case· agreement· anaphoragreement
effect · Sahaptin
1 The category of transitive subject
An analysis of ergative case, the special case of transitive subjects, can only be as
adequate as the theories of subjecthood and transitivity on which it rests. The lack
of a complete and satisfying formal analysis of ergative case cannot be independent
of the relatively meager attention afforded the study of transitivity within generative
grammar, and lack of integration of what is known about transitivity with what is
Department of Linguistics, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 226 South College, Amherst MA 01003
E-mail: amyrose@linguist.umass.edu2
known about subjecthood. This paper analyzes the case system of Nez Perce (Niimi-
ipuut´ ımt), which shows a ”three-way ergative”pattern, with an eye towards a formal-
ization of the category of transitive subject.1 Nez Perce provides a clear example of
a language for which a non-trivial transitivity criterion is required, as it treats both
one-argument clauses and certain two-argument clauses as intransitive in the sense
relevant to ergative case. It also shows the importance of an appropriate criterion
of subjecthood, as ergative appears on subjects from a variety of theta-roles and yet
is importantly syntactically constrained. An explanatory analysis of ergativity in a
particular language can only be produced once we can formalize the transitivity con-
dition for that language and incorporate this condition into what we know about the
category of subject. The present paper proposes such an analysis for Nez Perce.
The basic facts to be explained are shown in (1)-(2) below. As we see in these
examples, the case system of Nez Perce shows a three-way patterning: intransitive
subjects are unmarked for case, while both subjects and objects of transitive clauses
are case-marked.2
(1) Intransitive: subject unmarked
a. s´ ık’em
horse
hi-wlekix-tee’nix
3SUBJ-run-HAB.PL
h´ aamti’c.
fast
Horses run fast.
b. hi-pa-k’oomay-na
3SUBJ-S.PL-be.sick-PERF
mam´ ay’ac.
children
The children were sick.
c. Angel
A
w´ eet’u
NEG
hi-p´ ay-ca-qa
3SUBJ-arrive-IMPERF-REC.PAST
kii
this
m´ eeywi
morning
P´ ayniwas-pa.
Payniwas-LOC
Angel didn’t go to the Payniwas (caf´ e) this morning.
(2) Transitive: subject marked, object marked
a. ’ip-n´ ım
3SG-ERG
p´ ee-qn’i-se
3/3-dig-IMPERF
qeq´ ıi-ne.
edible.root-OBJ
He digs qeq´ ıit roots. (Crook, 1999, 238)
b. pit’´ ıin-im
girl-ERG
p´ aa-yaˆ x-na
3/3-ﬁnd-PERF
picp´ ıc-ne.
cat-OBJ
The girl found the cat.
1 Nez Perce is a Sahaptian language spoken in Idaho, Washington and Oregon. Examples are from
primary ﬁeldwork unless otherwise noted.
2 Abbreviations in Nez Perce glosses are ERG ergative case, OBJ objective case, GEN genitive case,
BEN benefactive case, LOC locative case, INST instrumental case, 3/3 third person subject and third per-
son object portmanteau verbal agreement, 3OBJ 3rd person object agreement, 3SUBJ 3rd person subject
agreement, O.PL plural object agreement, S.PL plural subject agreement, DIST distributive, IMPERF im-
perfective aspect (used for progressives and presently holding states), IMPERF.PL portmanteau marker
for imperfective aspect and plural subject, PERF perfective aspect, HAB habitual aspect (used for habitu-
als and generics), APPL1 goal applicative, APPL2 benefactive/malefactive/possessor applicative, CIS cis-
locative, FUT future, REC.PAST recent past tense, REM.PAST remote past tense, PART participle, NMLZR
nominalizer.3
c. sik’´ em-nim
horse-ERG
k´ unk’u
always
p´ ee-wewluq-se
3/3-want-IMPERF
timaan´ ıi-ne.
apple-OBJ
The horse always wants an apple.
The subject case seen in (2) is a canonical ergative case in that it appears only on the
subjects of transitive clauses, regardless of theta-role.3 Unlike in a canonical ergative
system, however,it appears not with an absolutive-(or zero-) markedobject, but only
with an object bearing an overt objective case marker.4
The second basic set of facts to account for concerns a sort of differential case-
marking. In addition to its unusual pattern of canonical case-marking, Nez Perce
allows a type ofclause in whichboth subject andobject case-markerscan go missing.
Thus by contrast to the examples in (2) we have the examples in (3):
(3) a. ’ip´ ı
3SG
hi-qn’´ ıi-se
3SUBJ-dig-IMPERF
qeq´ ıit.
edible.root
He digs qeq´ ıit roots. (Crook, 1999, 238)
b. pit’´ ıin
girl
hi-y´ aaˆ x-na
3SUBJ-ﬁnd-PERF
p´ ıcpic.
cat
The girl found her cat.
c. ke ’it´ uu
something
hi-w´ ewluq-se
3SUBJ-want-IMPERF
k´ unk’u
always
’icey´ eeye.
coyote
Coyote is always wanting something. (Aoki and Walker, 1989, 417)
Based on the morphology of this difference, I refer to clauses like (3) as CASELESS
CLAUSES.
Caseless clauses and the three-way case-marking system of Nez Perce allow us
to disentangle several different aspects of the category of transitive subject. We see
ﬁrst of all that ergative case is possible in the absence of absolutive case. This means
we cannot capture the transitive subject simply as that core argumentthat remains for
case-marking after absolutive is assigned (cf. Yip et al. 1987). And we see in cases
like (3) that the precise formulation of the transitivity condition on ergative case is
non-trivial in Nez Perce: certain clauses with two referential arguments, for instance
(3b), prohibit the ergative (and objective) case.
The major empirical argument to be made here is that ergative case in Nez Perce
is dependent on the syntax of the object, and not on lexical transitivity (i.e. the pres-
ence of a theme DP) or theta-role assignment.5 The form of the transitivity condition
relevant to Nez Perce concerns object agreement: if the object can agree, both object
and subject bear case. If the object is barred from agreement for whatever reason,
case-marking for both subject and object is ruled out. Whatever the abstract syntac-
tic properties of the subject may be, the realization of case-marking on subjects has
3 On the variety of theta-roles available for the transitive subject in Nez Perce, see section 4.1.
4 Thus, in terms of the common terminology, Nez Perce has an ergative case, but is not an ”ergative
language”. See e.g. Hockett (1958, 235), ”[in a language of] the ergative type: a case which we shall call
the nominative appears for the subject of an intransitive verb and for the object of a transitive verb, while
a second case, the ergative, appears for the subject of a transitive verb.”
5 This is to say, the analysis here treats ergative as substantially dependent. Previous case dependency
theories include Yip et al. (1987), Marantz (1991), Bittner and Hale (1996), McFadden (2004).4
to consider the syntax of another argument. It is this that constitutes the transitivity
condition on ergative case.
In view of this transitivity condition,what can we say about the nature of ergative
case? That ergativecase comes about at the intersection of object agreement and sub-
jecthood raises the intriguing prospect that ergative may be no more than the simple
sum of these factors. The special case of the transitive subject need not be accorded
the status of a grammatical primitive whose distribution is determined by factors in-
volving subjecthood and transitivity; rather, it can be dissolved into subjecthood and
transitivity. In this paper, I develop a new approach to ergative case whereby the
ergative case marker is a morphological spell-out of the syntactic agreement system.
The plot is as follows. In section 2, I lay out the paradigms of case and case-
lessness in Nez Perce, along with their attendant agreement patterns. I then turn to
the question of transitivity, arguing that the transitivity condition on ergative case in
Nez Perce involves object agreement. In order to show that it is object agreement
and not some other aspect of the syntax of objects that conditions case-marking, we
must explore in some depth the syntax of caseless clauses. I show that caselessness
is not a uniﬁed syntactic phenomenon (pace Rude 1985, Woolford 1997, Carnie and
Cash Cash 2006). Two distinct syntactic conﬁgurations result in caselessness in Nez
Perce, one a predicative object construction and one a binding conﬁguration where
agreement is blocked by an anaphor agreement effect. The two constructions are
distinguished syntactically and semantically, but share the caselessness morphology.
The fact that case-marking is blocked in these two separate instances, even in spite
of their rather different syntactic and semantic properties, shows that the transitiv-
ity condition on ergative case does not directly reﬂect object interpretation; i.e. we
cannot capture all instances of caselessness as ”pseudo-incorporation” of the object
(cf. Carnie and Cash Cash 2006). Rather, looking at the commonalities between the
two types of caseless clauses, it is only the failure of object agreement that correlates
systematically with the absence of ergative case.
To integrate this formalization of the transitivity criterion into a theory of sub-
jecthood, I argue that the transitive subject should be deﬁned as that argument which
participatesinsubjectagreementandwithwhichobjectagreementfeaturesareshared
(section 4). I then provide a locally calculable, post-syntactic account of case mark-
ing in Nez Perce using the tools of Distributed Morphology (Halle and Marantz,
1993), section 5. These tools allow us to adopt a reductionist approach to ergative:
the ergativemarker is inserted post-syntacticallyat a nominal node that bears the fea-
tures of both subject and object. Nez Perce does not require any grammatical feature
[ergative], syntactic or morphological. The paper concludes with an extension of the
presentanalysis toSahaptin,whereergativecaseonthesubjectdependsontheperson
speciﬁcation of the object.5
2 Case and caselessness: the paradigm
NezPercejoinsa geneticallydiverseset oflanguageswithathree-waymorphological
distinction in core argument case-marking, all of them, unfortunately,understudied.6
Sentences (4) show the three forms: no case on intransitive subjects, e.g. p´ ıcpic ‘cat’
in (4a); ergative nm or its allomorphs on transitive subjects, e.g. kinm picp´ ıcnim in
(4b); and objective ne or its allomorphs on transitive objects, e.g. cu’y´ emne ‘ﬁsh’
in (4b). For neutrality, I provide no gloss for the absence of morphological case on
intransitive subjects.
(4) a. hi-pn´ ım-se
3SUBJ-sleep-IMPERF
p´ ıcpic.
cat
The cat is sleeping.
b. ki-nm
this-ERG
picp´ ıc-nim
cat-ERG
pee-p-´ u’
3/3-eat-FUT
cu’y´ eem-ne.
ﬁsh-OBJ
This cat will eat the ﬁsh.
AkeyfeatureoftheNezPercecase systemis thatthe twocases foundintransitive
clauses are not independent of one another: in most cases, the presence of ERG case
requires the presence of OBJ case, and vice versa.7 Caveats of two types are relevant
to this generalization. First, some nouns never inﬂect for one case or the other. This
includesafewnominalssuchas’iw´ eepne‘wife’:herethesingleform’iw´ eepneserves
for both intransitive subject and transitive object (i.e., *’iw´ eepnene). In addition, as
in many other languages, less than a full case paradigm is found for ﬁrst and second
person pronouns.8 In Nez Perce these pronouns fall into two classes: those which
inﬂect for OBJ but not for ERG, e.g. ’iin 1SG and ’iim 2SG, and those which do not
decline at all, e.g. ’ee 2SG and k´ ıye 1PL.INCL. These classes are exempliﬁed in (5)
and (6) respectively.
6 Besides Nez Perce and closely related Sahaptin (for which see section 6), languages where nominals
show three-way distinctions include Australian languages Pitta-Pitta (Blake, 1987), Wangkumara (Breen
1976, Blake 1987), Antekerrepenhe/Aranda (Strehlow 1944, Bittner and Hale 1996), Luritja (Holmer,
1963), Duungidjawu/Waga-Waga (Wurm, 1976), Thangu/Yuulngu (Wurm, 1976), and Yidiny (Dixon,
1994, 87); Peruvian language Cashinawa (Dixon, 1994, 86); languages of Nepal such as Nepali (Bandhu,
1973) and Kham (Watters, 1973); Indian languages Nocte (Das Gupta, 1971), Marathi (Pandharipande,
1997), and Hindi; and Malaysian language Semelai (Kruspe, 2004). A larger class of languages could be
considered to show a tripartite system if we include languages where both ergative/absolutive and nom-
inative/accusative patterns are attested, but with different sets of nominals; e.g. in Australian languages
such as Margany (Breen, 1981), pronouns show a nominative/accusative pattern whereas other nominals
show an ergative/absolutive pattern. Discussion of languages with three-way case patterns and previous
theoretical proposals can be found in Bittner and Hale (1996), Woolford (1997) and Legate (2008). My
own view is that three-way languages form a diverse class, as ergative systems do more generally. The
classiﬁcation of languages as ergative/absolutive versus three-way is a typology of surface forms and not
necessarily a guide to analysis.
7 This generalization supposes both subject and object are realized overtly. In Nez Perce texts and free
discourse, this is rarely the case; however, argument drop has no effect on agreement or case-marking of
other arguments. For this reason, I abstract away from null arguments here.
8 Yet this is not a universal of ergative languages or of three-way languages; e.g. Australian languages
Pitta-Pitta and Wangkumara are fully three-way with no exception for pronouns.6
person number intrans subject trans subject objective
1st person singular ’iin ’iin ’´ ıine
plural inclusive k´ ıye k´ ıye k´ ıye
plural exclusive nuun nuun n´ uune
2nd person singular ’iim ’iim ’imen´ e
’ee ’ee ’ee
plural ’im´ e ’im´ e ’im´ uune
’eetx ’eetx ’eetx
3rd person singular ’ip´ ı ’ipn´ ım ’ipn´ e
plural ’im´ e ’im´ eem ’im´ uune
Table 1 The pronominal system
(5) a. ’iin
1SG
lil´ ooy-ca.
be.happy-IMPERF
I’m happy.
b. ’iin
1SG
w´ eet’u
NEG
’it´ uu-ne
INDEF-OBJ
’aa-p-s´ a-qa.
3OBJ-eat-IMPERF-REC.PAST
I didn’t eat anything.
c. ciq’´ aamqal-m
dog-ERG
hi-ke’n´ ıp-e
3SUBJ-bite-PERF
’´ ıin-e.
1SG-OBJ
The dog bit me.
(6) a. k´ ıye
1PL.INCL
ku-s´ ıix
go-IMPERF.PL
m´ uut’e-tx.
downstream-to
We are going downstream.
b. k´ ıye
1PL.INCL
’a-kat’a’w-cix
3OBJ-drink.up-IMPERF.PL
lal´ ax-na
coffee-OBJ
’etke
because
hi-yaw’icwi-yo’.
3SUBJ-become.cold-FUT
We should ﬁnish (are ﬁnishing) the coffee because it will get cold.
c. ’inpe’weet-´ um
police-ERG
k´ ıye
1PL.INCL
hi-naas-payn-´ oo-yo’!
3SUBJ-O.PL-arrive-APPL1-FUT
The cops might come upon us!
The pronominalsystem is summarizedin table 1. In addition to the person split in the
expression of ergative case between 1st/2nd and 3rd person pronouns, we observe as
well that all three indeclensiblepronounsinclude a 2nd personfeature (assuming that
a 1st person inclusive bears both ﬁrst and second person features). The nature of this
person split remains at present a topic for further research.9
Further interference in the mutual dependence between subject and object cases
in the transitive clause can come about when the subject contains a genitive modiﬁer.
9 Themajor challenge for the study ofpronouns, and indeed the reason this topic cannot be satisfactorily
treated here, is the relation between the ergative and the genitive. These cases are, to my knowledge, in
every way morphophonologically identical in Nez Perce, except for their distribution with 1st/2nd person
pronouns: those pronouns that inﬂect at all do inﬂect for genitive, but never for ergative. For present
purposes we might assume that this pattern shows that ergative and genitive forms are listed as separate
vocabulary items, though an explanation for that state of affairs is still lacking.7
According to Rude (1985), the presence of genitive case within a nominal phrase
blocks the expression of ergative and objective case on the head of the phrase.10
Thus, in contrast to (7), where the subject bears ERG case, genitive haamanm‘man’s’
blocks case on ciq’´ aamqal ‘dog’ in (8).
(7) ciq’´ aamqal-m
dog-ERG
p´ a-’naxpay-ka
3/3-bring-PERF
pip´ ıs-ne.
bone-OBJ
The dog brought the bone. (Rude, 1985, 198)
(8) h´ aama-nm
man-GEN
ciq’´ aamqal
dog
p´ a-’naxpay-ka
3/3-bring-PERF
pip´ ıs-ne.
bone-OBJ
The man’s dog brought the bone. (Rude, 1985, 198)
Agreement and object case-marking are unaffected in such examples.
As verbal inﬂection varies along with case-marking in caseless clauses, a sum-
mary is in order here. Person marker morphemes occupy the leftmost preﬁx position
in the verb word; overt person preﬁxation is for third persons only.11 Number agree-
ment follows person agreement, with subject number agreement to the left of object
numberagreement.With plural subjects, verbs either preﬁx pe- or sufﬁx –ix (depend-
ingonaspect);with pluralobjects,verbspreﬁxn´ ees-.Clauses with 3rdpersonsubject
and3rdpersonsingularobjectpreﬁxp´ ee(wheresubjectagreementis preﬁxal,thereis
the additional criterion that the subject be singular); clauses with 3rd person objects
and a 1st/2nd person subject preﬁx ’e; otherwise, clauses with 3rd person subjects
preﬁx hi. Table 2 summarizes.
The case and agreement systems converge on the notions of subject and direct
object. If any nominal is marked ERG, it will be that nominal controlling subject
agreement; if any nominal is marked OBJ, it will be that nominal controlling object
agreement. Object agreement and object case go hand in hand. If the object marks
case, it must agree; if it agrees, it must mark case (unless it is not overtly realized
at all). Subject agreement, on the other hand, picks out the subject nominal even in
10 Rude reports this pattern as absolute; for my consultants, the blocking is optional, with a preference
for case to be marked.
(i) ’´ ıin-im
1SG-GEN
ciq’´ aamqal(-nim)
dog-ERG
p´ ee-p-teetu
3/3-eat-HAB
nuk´ uu-ne.
meat-OBJ
My dog eats meat.
This difference may reﬂect dialect variation or language change.
11 This rather sharp person split in verbal inﬂectional morphology is counterbalanced by person in-
ﬂection on certain typically clause-initial particles: these particles agree with 1st/2nd person arguments,
but never with 3rd persons. Crook (1999, 214) suggests that this pattern results from reanalysis of second-
position clitics (such as are still found in Sahaptin) originally ordered 2nd person ¿ 1st person ¿ 3rd person;
the 2nd and 1st person inﬂections are presently found as sufﬁxes on typically clause-initial items, whereas
the 3rd person inﬂections are preﬁxes on verbs. Interestingly the same plural morpheme, pe, is found in
both systems. The following example shows the agreeing particle weet, marker of yes/no questions.
(i) w´ eete-pe-m-ex
Y.N-PL-2-1
n´ aas-apaa-p-o’-qa
O.PL-CAUSE-eat-FUT-REC.PAST
cep´ eepyuˆ xtin’
pie
?
Can I make you (pl) eat some pie? (Crook, 1999, 216)8
A. The person marking system.
subject object
1st - -
2nd - -
3rd hi- ’e
p´ ee
B. The number marking system.
subject object
singular - -
plural pe- or -iix nees-
C. Combined paradigm (preﬁxal subject number agreement)
O B J
no obj 1/2 sg 1/2 pl 3 sg 3 pl
S 1/2 sg - - nees ’e ’enees
U 1/2 pl pe pe penees ’epe ’epenees
B 3 sg hi hi hinees pee hinees
J 3 pl hipe hipe hipenees hipe hipenees
Table 2 Verbal inﬂection for person and number
subject agr subject case object agr object case
canonical Y Y Y Y
caseless Y n n n
intransitive Y n
Table 3 Summary of case and agreement patterns
the absence of subject case, i.e. in intransitives. It retains its role as identiﬁer of the
subject regardless of the case of the subject nominal, whether ERG in a transitive or
unmarked in an intransitive.
Overall, the case and agreement paradigms show similarity between caseless
clausesandintransitiveclauses.Whileallclausesshowsubjectagreement,onlycanon-
ical transitive clauses show object agreement and case-marking. This is summarized
in Table 3. A note on terminology is in order here. Below, I argue that the ‘caseless’
row in Figure 3 has only a morphological status, not a syntactic one. Syntactically,
caseless clauses are not a natural class. There is not cause to reach such a conclusion
for cased clauses (e.g. (2a), (4b), (7)), however. I maintain that cased clauses rep-
resent the transitive morphology and syntax of Nez Perce. Therefore, since we can
identify the cased morphology with syntactic transitivity, I refer to such clauses as
TRANSITIVES.12
A ﬁnal factor to make note of in this introductory section is notable primarily
for its irrelevance to the problem of case-marking; this factor is word order. Word
order varies in transitive examples and in caseless examples. It serves a discourse
function, as discussed by Rude (1992). In the discussion below I abstract away from
this variation, assuming a strictly conﬁgurational grammar for Nez Perce, and (as an
12 Terminology differs across previous accounts; mostnotably, the transitive clause type islabelled ‘erga-
tive’ by Rude (1985 et seq.). Previous treatments of the clause type alternation include Aoki (1970, 1994);
as a voice alternation, Rude (1985), Crook (1999); as a case alternation, Woolford (1997), Carnie and
Cash Cash (2006). Of these, only Crook (1999) suggests that caseless clauses may be syntactically di-
verse, noting that “intransitive morphology is found with transitive verbs in two kinds of situations. One is
akin to possessor raising ... The other is a kind of antipassive” (p. 237).9
arbitrary choice) depict a VO order for the Nez Perce VP. We will see some reason
to assume that Nez Perce is indeed conﬁgurational (in particular, a subject-object
asymmetry in binding) as the discussion proceeds.13
3 The transitivity condition
We turn now to the question of what it means for ergative case to target the transitive
subject, beginningwith the question of transitivity. In contrast to the more traditional
view, which takes transitivity to be a feature of verbs themselves, recent theoretical
work has largely taken a decompositional approach, positing that transitivity is cre-
ated or at least represented by functional structure separate from the verb itself (i.a.
Bowers 1993, 2002, Kratzer 1996, 2003, Legate 2006). Perhaps the best-known ver-
sion of this approach is that which takes external arguments to be introduced not by
the verb itself but by a functional head or ‘light verb’ v or Voice (Kratzer, 1996). I
will call this family of theories the v-model. This model has well-explored seman-
tic and syntactic arguments in its favor (see e.g. Marantz 1984, Kratzer 1996, 2003,
Pylkk¨ anen 2002), though I will not review them here.
(9) v-model:
External arguments are not introduced by verbs (V), but by a separate piece
of functional structure (v).
An important consequence of the v-model’s decompositional approach is that it
requires us to to ﬁnd a new conception of transitivity that does not rely on any se-
mantic or lexical distinction between transitive and intransitive Vs. This is because
the task of introducing external arguments, the second argument taken to yield the
transitivity of many verbs, has been decomposed out into the v head. Thus a transi-
tive verbalprojectionlike that in Johnfound Allen is representedas a vP which, while
transitive overall, contains no head that introduces two arguments.14
(10) vP
John v
v
lxle. agent(x)(e)
VP
V
ﬁnd: lyle. finding(y)(e)
Allen
13 I assume that word order freedom in Nez Perce is created by rather free movement into the C-domain.
In support of this proposal, relative clause material can sometimes appear to the left of the relative clause
complementizer, suggesting it dominates at least some of the C-domain.
14 In this paper I adopt a moderate version of the v-model which takes theme arguments to be introduced
by verbs. It is possible to adopt a more radical version of this model and decompose out the object as well,
as in Borer (2005); see Kratzer (2003) for arguments against this proposal. In either case a new deﬁnition
of transitivity is required.10
Integratingthe v-modelwith a structural approachto the unergative/unaccusativedis-
tinction, we ﬁnd that functors just like those in (10) are found in intransitives as well:
unergatives contain v introducing their external argument, and unaccusatives contain
a verb root like that in (10) introducing their internal argument.15
(11) John jumped [unergative]
vP
John v
v
lxle. agent(x)(e)
V
jumped: le. jumping(e)
(12) John grew [unaccusative]
VP
V
grew: lyle. growing(x)(e)
John
Thus we cannot say that transitivity results either from the presence of v or from the
presence of a V that takes an argument. If the v-model is to be maintained, some
additional factor must be introduced in order for a language to systematically distin-
guish a class of transitives from both unergative and unaccusative intransitives, as is
the case in Nez Perce and other ergative languages. In this section, I argue that the
factor that distinguishes between transitive and intransitive clauses in Nez Perce is
the presence of object agreement.
The data most crucial to the study of transitivity in Nez Perce come from caseless
clauses (see section 2), clauses which share their case pattern with intransitives but
have two arguments instead of one. Two minimal pairs of transitive and caseless
clauses are repeated below.
(13) a. ’ip-n´ ım
3SG-ERG
p´ ee-qn’i-se
3/3-dig-IMPERF
qeq´ ıi-ne.
edible.root-OBJ
He digs qeq´ ıit roots. (Crook, 1999, 238)
b. ’ip´ ı
3SG
hi-qn’´ ıi-se
3SUBJ-dig-IMPERF
qeq´ ıit.
edible.root
He digs qeq´ ıit roots. (Crook, 1999, 238)
(14) a. pit’´ ın-im
girl-ERG
p´ aa-yaˆ x-na
3/3-ﬁnd-PERF
picp´ ıc-ne.
cat-OBJ
The girl found the cat.
15 Unaccusatives may also contain a vP projection, though with a v head that does not introduce an
argument. See Deal (to appear) for some evidence that this might be the case.11
b. pit’´ ın
girl
hi-y´ aaˆ x-na
3SUBJ-ﬁnd-PERF
p´ ıcpic.
cat
The girl found her cat.
Caseless clauses show that the presence of two arguments is not sufﬁcient to render
a clause transitive in the sense relevant to case-marking in Nez Perce. Clauses like
(14b) show that even assuring the referentiality of these two arguments will not do
the trick.
This section shows that caseless clauses, and hence the factors underlying the
transitivity effect in Nez Perce, are heterogeneous in origin. Two separate sets of
conditions bleed case-marking: a predicative object construction and a binding con-
ﬁguration that blocks agreement. While the constructions both concern the syntax of
the object and are morphologically indistinguishable, their syntax and semantics di-
verge in several notable ways. I argue that the major commonality between caseless
clauses due to predicative objects, e.g. (13b), and those due to binding, e.g. (14b), is
the failure of object agreement. It is object agreement, therefore, in terms of which
the transitivity condition on Nez Perce ergative case must be stated.
3.1 The heterogeneity of caselessness: the evidence
A distinction between two types or functions of caseless clauses is recognized in the
descriptive literature dating to Rude (1985). Rude notes that caselessness has two
syntactic/discourse functions: to encode what he calls a “non-topical” object, and to
encode that the subject is the object’s possessor. These correspondto cases (13b) and
(14b); further examples of each type are given below.
(15) ”Non-topical object”
p´ aaˆ xloo
ﬁve.HUM
ha’´ ayat
women
hi-’ˆ xni-s´ ıix
3SUBJ-dig-IMPERF.PL
q´ e’mes.
camas
Five women are digging camas. (Phinney, 1934, 185)
(16) Subject = object possessor
hi-w´ ewluq-se
3SUBJ-want-IMPERF
c’ol´ akstimt
hand.drum
ˆ x´ aˆ xaac.
grizzly
Grizzly wants his hand-drum. (Phinney, 1934, 83)
Rude makes an important ﬁrst distinction between the two cases. In the ﬁrst case,
where the object is merely “non-topical”, caselessness is grammatically optional; the
transitive construction may also be used with a comparable meaning (see e.g. mini-
mal pair (13)). In the second case, however, caselessness is obligatory. If a transitive
construction is used, the meaning of possession is lost. This is seen in (14) and in the
following pair from Aoki (1994, 381).
(17) a. ’iin
1SG
l´ awlimq-sa
ﬁx-IMPERF
p´ ıskis.
door
I am ﬁxing my door.12
b. ’iin
1SG
’a-l´ awlimq-sa
3OBJ-ﬁx-IMPERF
pisk´ ıs-ne.
door-OBJ
I am ﬁxing a door.
I refer to clauses like (17a) where subject binds object possessor as EXTENDED RE-
FLEXIVES, following Aissen (1999, 473).
Below, I show that optionally caseless clauses like (13b) and (15) are predicative
object constructions or ANTIPASSIVES (as they are translated; the strings are them-
selves ambiguous), syntactically and semantically different from transitive clauses,
whereas extended reﬂexive caseless clauses like (14b) and (17a) share the syntax
of transitive clauses despite their caseless morphology.16 The two constructions di-
verge on a number of tests. First, on the deﬁniteness and referentiality of the object:
antipassive objects are weak indeﬁnites, whereas extended reﬂexive objects are typi-
cally deﬁnite.In terms of scope,antipassive objects cannotscope overthe distributive
quantiﬁerwi-, whereasextendedreﬂexiveobjectsmust.Finally,the twoconstructions
have different distributions: antipassive is restricted to theme arguments,whereas ex-
tended reﬂexives encompass applicative arguments and goals.
3.1.1 Evidence from deﬁniteness
Extended reﬂexive clauses typically have deﬁnite objects. This is true under two
senses of ”deﬁnite”: these objects typically pick out referents that are unique (within
some salient domain), and often also pick out referents that are discourse-old.17 The
following examples involve referents that are unique.
(18) hek´ ı-ce
see-IMPERF
’´ ıin-im
1SG-GEN
in´ ıit.
house
I see my house.
(19) p´ ıke
mother
h´ eetewi-se
love-IMPERF
I love my mother
In the following case, we see that an extended reﬂexive is felicitous where the object
is discourse-old.In extended reﬂexive clause (20e), the object (Coldweather’s father)
has been mentioned in each of the four previous clauses.
(20) [FromWarmweatherandColdweather,AokiandWalker (1989,62)]Oneday
Coldweather’sfatherorderedher,”Go andvisit youruncles[theWarmweath-
ers] and see how they are.” Then she started from there. Coldweather dashed
into the Warmweather teepee. She sat down and squatted there. ”You are the
16 The use of the term ‘antipassive’ here follows Rude 1985 et seq. The Nez Perce antipassive differs
from a classical antipassive construction in not showing oblique case on the object (which I take to be a
low-level effect) and in not showing an antipassive morpheme in the verb. See Deal (2007) for an argument
that the semantic composition of property-type object constructions in Nez Perce is mediated by a covert
antipassive morpheme.
17 On the importance of distinguishing two kinds of deﬁniteness, see Schwarz (2008).13
image of hunger,” said the old man [Warmweather], and he threw a piece of
liver at her. She caught it and gobbled it as she ran back.
a. pist
father
hi-w´ eeleylek-uu-kike,
3SUBJ-run-APPL1-PERF.TRANS
She ran into her father,
b. ’is´ ıimet
behold
hi-w´ aawsiqatk-sa
3SUBJ-sit.with.legs.spread-IMPERF
qiiwn
old.man
behold, the old man is sitting there
c. kaa
and
’ip-n´ ım-ke
3SG-ERG-too
p´ aa-tamy-a’n-ya
3/3-throw-APPL2-PERF
k’´ ıima-ki
half-INST
sit´ ’eˆ xs-ki
liver-INST
And she too threw a half liver at him
d. kaa
and
p´ a-tamtay-na,
3/3-tell-PERF
and she told him,
e. pist
father
hi-h´ ı-ne
3SUBJ-say-PERF
ku’´ us
thus
hi-wy´ aakaa’aw-cix.
3SUBJ-live-IMPERF.PL
to her father she said, ”Thus they are living.”
Such discourses conﬁrm the possibility of deﬁnite semantics for extended reﬂexive
objects.
The objects of antipassives, by contrast to extended reﬂexives, can only be indef-
inite. Antipassives are not felicitous where the object is discourse-old. This can be
seen in the following example, where the context gives us a discourse-old referent,
a particular house in Lewiston. If we use the antipassive construction, ’in´ ıit ‘house’
cannot refer to this house that has been under discussion. It must introduce a novel
referrent into the discourse. Note that this does not obtain in the transitive sentence,
(21a).
(21) Context: One house in Lewiston is red, and yesterday, John found that house.
a. C´ aan-nim
John-ERG
p´ aa-’yaˆ x-na
3/3-ﬁnd-PERF
’in´ ıi-ne.
house-OBJ
John found the house.
b. Caan
John
hi-’y´ aaˆ x-na
3SUBJ-ﬁnd-PERF
’in´ ıit.
house
John found a house.
Comment: ”It’s not referring to the red house or anything, it’s just he just
found a house that he’s been looking for”
Antipassives are also infelicitous where the object is a referential term, for instance a
proper name.
(22) Context: we’re organizing a ballgame and picking players for our teams.
a. nuun
1PL
’e-wewluq-siix
3OBJ-want-IMPERF.PL
Harold-ne
H-OBJ
poˆ xpok’l´ ıit-ki.
ballgame-INST
We want Harold for the ballgame. [transitive]14
b. # nuun
1PL
wewluq-siix
want-IMPERF.PL
Harold
H
poˆ xpok’l´ ıit-ki.
ballgame-INST
Intended: We want Harold for the ballgame. [antipassive]
Where proper names can be used non-referentially, antipassives are licit. Certain in-
tensional contexts allow proper names to be interpreted indeﬁnitely. (23) shows such
anexample.ThenamesMeli andCosef heredonotrefertoanyparticularindividuals;
rather, what is expressed is a desire for unspeciﬁed individuals meeting the descrip-
tion ‘a Mary’ and ‘a Joseph’.
(23) k´ ısmis-pe
christmas-LOC
sap´ atk’ayn
show
wewluq-siix
want-IMPERF.PL
Meli
Mary
kaa
and
Cosef.
Joseph
For the Christmas show we want a Mary and a Joseph.
On the basis of deﬁniteness effects and scopal behavior, Deal (2007) argued that
antipassive objects in Nez Perce are predicative or ”non-speciﬁc”, which we can
formalize semantically as being of a property-type, < e,t > (see van Geenhoven
1998, Farkas and de Swart 2003, Chung and Ladusaw 2004, Deal 2008b).18 Cross-
linguistically, property-type objects are a subclass of indeﬁnites in that they can-
not refer to entities already established in a discourse context (Mohanan 1995, van
Geenhoven 1998, Farkas and de Swart 2003; cf. the analysis of certain deﬁnites as
property-type by Zimmermann 1992).
What we see in these data overall is that caseless clauses bifurcate in the range of
interpretations available to the object: antipassive objects must be indeﬁnite, whereas
extended reﬂexive objects can be deﬁnite. In this way the extended reﬂexive patterns
with the transitive and not with the antipassive, although it is caseless. Thus, we can-
not hold either case-marking or its absence responsible for referentiality/deﬁniteness
in Nez Perce; we also cannot implicate object interpretation as the decisive factor
behind the transitivity condition, since caseless clauses like (18) have fully deﬁnite,
referential objects.
3.1.2 Evidence from VP quantiﬁcation
Cross-linguistically, predicative objects are restricted to narrowest scope. I suggested
above that antipassive objects are predicative, but extended reﬂexive objects typi-
cally are referential. We predict then that antipassive objects should be scopally inert
whereas extended reﬂexive objects should be able to take scope over other operators.
Theverbaldistributivepreﬁxwi-providesscopalevidenceconﬁrmingthis prediction,
distinguishing extended reﬂexives from antipassives. In line with the deﬁniteness
facts, extended reﬂexive objects behave like transitive objects, whereas antipassive
objects are a class apart.
While Nez Perce has several quantiﬁers that appear in its nominal phrases, e.g.
´ oykalo/a‘everyone/thing’,la’´ am‘all’,thesedonotrequiredistributivequantiﬁcation.
The distributive quantiﬁer is a verbal preﬁx wi-, which appears between inﬂectional
18 Semantic types used in this paper are e, the type of entities (objects), t, the type of propositions, and
s, the type of events.15
preﬁxes and derivational ones. The structural position of this quantiﬁer invites com-
parison to VP-quantiﬁers in familiar languages, e.g. each in (24).
(24) The kids will each feed the horse.
The presence of a VP quantiﬁer in Nez Perce has no effect on case or agreement.
The argument with which the quantiﬁer associates (or: over which it distributes) is in
general determinedon an ‘absolutive’basis. In a transitive clause, wi- associates with
the case-marked object, rather than the subject (Rude 1985, 42, Crook 1999, 135):
(25) nuun
we
’e-n´ ees-wi-kiwyek-siix
3OBJ-O.PL-DIST-feed-IMPERF.PL
sik’´ em-ne.
horse-OBJ
We fed each of the horses.
NOT: We each fed some horses (but some horses were not fed).
(26) ’e-n´ ees-wii-wetkuyk-six
3OBJ-O.PL-DIST-take.away-IMPERF.PL
t´ uhuc
match
mam´ ay’ac-na.
children-OBJ
We are taking matches away from each of the children. (Crook, 1999, 135)
NOT: We each are taking matches away from the children.
In a transitive clause, the use of wi- requires a semantically plural object.19 If the
object is singular, the quantiﬁer cannot be used, (27b).
(27) a. Distribution over plural object
Taqc
today
ti-t´ eeqis-nim
PL-elder-ERG
hi-n´ ees-wi-wewkuni-se
3SUBJ-O.PL-DIST-meet-IMPERF
hitemeneweet´ uu-ne.
student-OBJ
Today the elders are meeting with each student.
NOT: Today the elders are each meeting with (the) students.
b. Singular object: can’t use quantiﬁer
Taqc
today
ti-t´ eeqis-nim
PL-elder-ERG
pee-(*wi-)wewkuni-s´ ıix
3/3-(*DIST-)meet-IMPERF.PL
Harold-ne.
Harold-OBJ
Today the elders are (*each) meeting with (*each) Harold.
We can treat such examples as cases where the object nominal has escaped the scope
of the distributive operator. Instead of forming part of the predicate that is distributed
over individuals (e.g. feeding in (25)), the transitive object escapes and becomes the
element of which the distributed property is predicated. Structurally speaking, the
nominal associates with the quantiﬁer by moving to a position immediately above
the quantiﬁer. Thus, in (25), a property of being fed is predicated distributively of
a plurality of horses. (28a) schematizes syntactically, and (28b) schematizes the se-
mantic interpretation of such a structure.20
19 The object does not have to be morphologically marked for plural, but it must denote a plurality. Most
Nez Perce nouns do not inﬂect for number. In (27a) the form hitemeneweet´ uune ‘student-OBJ’ can pick
out either a singular student or a plurality of students; the latter possibility enables the use of DIST.
20 Theposition of the lambda term in (28b) is related to the way movement is interpreted here: movement
of the nominal creates a predicate, and DIST operates over this predicate (roughly: requiring it to be a
predicate that applies to a plurality only if it applies to each atomic part of the plurality). The resulting
property is predicated of the moved nominal.16
(28) a.
horses
DIST VP
feed t
b.
(the) horses
DIST
lx VP
feed tx
Here the DIST head merges lower than the v head which introduces the agent argu-
ment, meaning that the object does not have to move across the subject in order to
arriveatSpec,DIST.Itseemsreasonabletoassumethatthemovementoftheobject,in
(25) sik’emne ‘horses’, to Spec,DIST is related to those factors independentlyknown
to move referential/presuppositionalobjects out of VP (Diesing, 1992). This helps us
understand the effect in (27b), where a singular object in a transitive clause bars the
use of wi-: if the object can move to Spec,DIST, then DIST can only associate with
the object (i.e., it cannot associate with the subject). As the singular referential object
can move out of VP, DIST must associate with it; but this is ruled out on semantic
grounds.
In an intransitive clause, wi- distributes over the subject, regardless of agency:
(29) a. hah´ acwaal
boys
hi-pe-w´ ı-wece-ye
3SUBJ-S.PL-DIST-mount-PERF
sik’´ em-pe.
horse-LOC
The boys each got on a horse.
b. ’´ eete
surely
hi-pe-w´ ı-ti’nx-ne
3SUBJ-S.PL-DIST-die-PERF
’ilˆ xn´ ıi-we
many-HUMAN
tit´ ooqan.
person
Surely many people have each died. (Phinney, 1934, 21)
Unaccusatives, such as (29b), can be explained just as in (28a), with the underlying
object subsequently becoming the subject. In unergatives, however, there is no nom-
inal within VP which can move to Spec,DIST. In a v-model, agent arguments are
arguments of v, not of the verb itself; therefore, the predicate that DIST will need to
render distributive in an unergative is in fact the agency predicate itself. (For exam-
ple, predicated of ‘boys’ in (29a) is the distributed property of being the agent of a
mounting event.) Thus, DIST must be merged above v in unergatives.21
With this background,we turn again to contrasts between the antipassive and ex-
tended reﬂexive. In an antipassive clause, wi- distributes over the subject, paralleling
the intransitive case (Rude, 1985, 160):
(30) a. Context: an egg hunt
21 It is not clear why DIST cannot more generally be merged above v, giving rise to distribution over the
agent even in the presence of an object (e.g. in (25), (26)). More research is needed on this point.17
mam´ ayac
children
hi-pa-w´ ı-’yaˆ x-na
3SUBJ-S.PL-DIST-ﬁnd-PERF
t´ aam’am.
egg
The children each found eggs (but perhaps not all eggs were found).
NOT: The children found each egg (but perhaps not all children were
egg-ﬁnders).
b. ’´ oykal-oo
all-HUMAN
hi-w´ ıi-’nep-tin’ix
3SUBJ-DIST-hold-IMPERF.PL
wept´ ees-nim
eagle-GEN
tu’´ uynu.
tail.feather
They each are holding eagle tail feathers. (Aoki, 1979, 84)
NOT: They are holding each feather.
This ﬁnding accords well with the facts above about the interpretation of antipassive
objects. We saw that antipassive objects cannot be deﬁnite and proposedthat they are
predicative,property-type.Property-typeindeﬁnites (by contrast to referential terms)
are candidates for existential closure. In keeping with Diesing’s mapping hypothesis,
this suggests that the antipassive object remains within VP, failing to move out to
Spec,DIST. Since nothing can move to its speciﬁer to serve as its argument, DIST
cannot be merged below v, and distribution can only occur over the agent argument,
as in the unergative.22
In an extended reﬂexive clause, by contrast, the object is typically deﬁnite and
not subject to existential closure. Accordingly,the object leaves VP and wi- produces
a distributed property which is predicated of it, paralleling the transitive case:
(31) a. hah´ aacwal
boys
hi-pe-w´ ı-kiwyek-e
3SUBJ-S.PL-DIST-feed-PERF
s´ ık’em.
horse
The boysi fed each of theiri horses.
b. hi-w´ ı-hex-ni-me
3SUBJ-DIST-see-PERF-CIS
l´ awtiwaa-ma.
friend-PL
Hei saw each of hisi friends. (Phinney, 1934, 273)
On this test, as before, extended reﬂexive objects behave like transitive objects and
unlike antipassive objects; here, only the former scope over the distributive marker.
In both transitive and extended reﬂexive, the object leaves VP and can move to
Spec,DIST. This is in spite of the fact that extended reﬂexive clauses are caseless,
arguing, interestingly, that the factor that drives movement out of VP cannot be the
need to check a particular case.
22 This approach attempts to explain both why the antipassive object does not associate with the distribu-
tive quantiﬁer and why the antipassive subject does do so. The former fact could alternatively be explained
as a consequence of the obligatory indeﬁniteness of antipassive objects, given that indeﬁnites generally do
not associate with VP quantiﬁers (see Dowty and Brodie 1984):
(i) The students each left.
(ii) * Students each left.
(iii) * Some students each left.
Something else must be said to account for why antipassive subjects are able to associate with the distribu-
tive quantiﬁer where the object cannot, by contrast to transitive subjects with singular objects (see (27b)).18
3.1.3 Evidence from thematic restrictions
As ﬁnal evidence for a syntactic distinction between extended reﬂexives and antipas-
sives, the two phenomena do not have the same distribution. The extended reﬂexive
binding conﬁguration can bring about caselessness on applicative objects, goal ob-
jects and the object of hek´ ı ‘see’; antipassivization is not possible in any of these
cases.
The applicative sufﬁx -(y)´ uu- adds an goal argument to a transitive or intransitive
clause; the goal argument is marked with object case marking. Case marking is not
available for a theme or other object in this case, as shown in (32).
(32) qo’c
yet
taˆ xc
soon
kii(*-ne)
this(*-OBJ)
’ew-nehki-y´ uu-yu’
3OBJ-take-APPL1-FUT
q´ ıiwn-e.
old.man-OBJ
I will soon take this to the old man. (Phinney, 1934, 146)
The extended reﬂexive conﬁguration produces caselessness on applicative objects
(Rude, 1986, 145), while antipassive cannot. Thus, (33) can only have an extended
reﬂexive interpretation, and not an antipassive one.
(33) s´ ık’em
horse
hi-k-y´ uu-ye.
3SUBJ-go-APPL1-PERF
He went over to his own horse.
NOT: He went over to horses/a horse.
Similar facts are found with double object verbs. Here, as in the case of the overt
applicative, only the goal argument, not the theme, may receive case-marking and
agree with the verb.(34a)exempliﬁes.It is not possible to antipassivize this sentence,
as shown in (34b).
(34) a. ’ip´ eeˆ x
bread
hi-n´ ees-kiwyek-se
3SUBJ-PL.OBJ-feed-IMPERF
qetq´ eet-ne
duck-OBJ
’´ aayat-om.
woman-ERG
The woman is feeding bread to the ducks.
b. * ’ip´ eeˆ x
bread
hi-k´ ıwyek-se
3SUBJ-feed-IMPERF
q´ etqet
duck
’´ aayat.
woman
intended: The woman is feeding ducks bread.
Despite the ungrammaticality of antipassive (34b), caselessness is indeed possible in
double object sentences if it is due to an extended reﬂexive. (35) exempliﬁes.23
(35) ’´ aayat
woman
hi-k´ ıwyek-se
3SUBJ-feed-IMPERF
p´ ıcpic
cat
c´ uu’yem.
ﬁsh
The woman is feeding ﬁsh to her own cat.
23 My consultant noted in this case that the order p´ ıcpic c´ u’yem is required; the goal must precede the
theme. This is notable as word order is not generally revealing as to thematic role or syntactic position in
Nez Perce.19
Again in this case, the non-theme argument is obligatorily case-marked except in an
extended reﬂexive. Antipassivization is not available to produce caselessness on the
non-theme object.
A third restriction of this type is found with the verb hek´ ı ‘see’. No matter how
seemingly non-referential the object of this verb is, consultants do not allow antipas-
sive; (36) shows that the transitive structure is mandated even with a negative indeﬁ-
nite object (‘nothing’) or a property object (‘red’).24
(36) a. w´ eet’u
not
’it´ uu-ne
INDEF-OBJ
’ee-k´ ı-ce
3OBJ-see-IMPERF
(’´ etke
(because
h´ ıi-we-s
3SUBJ-be-IMPERF
cik’´ eet’is
dark)
).
I don’t see anything (because it’s dark).
b. ’ee-k´ ı-ce
3OBJ-see-IMPERF
’ilp’´ ılp.
red
I see red.
The generalization that emerges from the facts overall is that antipassivization
is restricted to theme arguments. This generalization re-emerges cross-linguistically:
Baker (1988, section 7.2.3.2) notes that regardless of which nominal is chosen for
case-markingor agreement in a particular language, only themes can incorporateand
antipassivize.25 In light of this ﬁnding, we may want to analyze hek´ ı ‘see’ as taking
a goal argument, perhaps rendering it more similar to ‘look at’ than to ‘see’ per se.
The pattern with arguments to this verb repeats once more the generalization from
applicative objects and goals in double object sentences: antipassive cannot apply to
the non-theme object, but extended reﬂexivity may render it caseless. An example
repeated from above shows caselessness with hek´ ı in an extended reﬂexive.
(37) hek´ ı-ce
see-IMPERF
’´ ıin-im
1SG-GEN
’in´ ıit.
house
I see my house.
Like caseless clauses with applicatives and double objects, caseless clauses with the
verb hek´ ı are not ambiguous. They may only have an extended reﬂexive interpreta-
tion.
We have now seen convergent evidence from four sources for a distinction be-
tween antipassive caseless clauses and extended reﬂexive caseless clauses. First, an-
tipassives alternate with transitives in a way that preserves the basic propositional
meaning; extended reﬂexives cannot alternate with transitives without losing their
binding pattern. Secondly, antipassive objects can only be indeﬁnite, whereas ex-
tended reﬂexiveobjects are typically deﬁnite. Third,antipassive objects cannot scope
24 Note that although ’ilp’ilp ‘red’ does not take OBJ case in (36b), object agreement on the verb unam-
biguously identiﬁes the transitive structure. Case concord between noun and adjective is generally optional
in Nez Perce.
25 This effect may be approximated with English incorporating agentive nominals such as money sender,
but *home sender (except on the reading ‘someone who sends homes’).20
over the distributive morphemewi-, whereas transitive objects and extendedreﬂexive
objects must do so. Finally, extended reﬂexives have a wider distribution than an-
tipassives do: only extended reﬂexivity can bring about caselessness on applicative
objects, goals, and the object of hek´ ı ‘see’.
We turn now to the structure of antipassives and extended reﬂexives, seeking to
know what, despite their syntactic and semantic differences, causes them to share the
caseless morphology, and so be classiﬁed as ‘intransitive’ in terms of case-marking.
We will see that the uniting factor is the failure of agreement with the object. Object
agreement fails in the antipassive due to the structure of the object; the antipassive
object is too small to agree. In the extended reﬂexive, the problem is not the structure
of the object itself but an anaphor agreement effect (Rizzi 1990, Woolford 1999).
3.2 The structure of antipassive objects
Following much work on the cross-linguistic semantics of scopally restricted, non-
referential objects (e.g. on Nez Perce, Deal 2007; on Eskimo languages, van Geen-
hoven1998,Wharram2003(cf.Bittner 1987,1994);onHindi,Mohanan1995,Dayal
2003; on Hungarian, Farkas and de Swart 2003; on Maori and Chamorro, Chung and
Ladusaw 2004),I assume that antipassive objects in Nez Perce are of a propertytype,
<e,t >.Thisisalsothetypeofthecommonnoun(seee.g.HeimandKratzer1998).26
By contrast to antipassive objects and bare commonnouns, referential DP objects are
of typee. This suggests that the semantic functionof (non-quantiﬁcational)determin-
ers is to produce names (i.e. expressions of type e) out of predicates (i.e. expressions
of type < e,t >). Such determiners are functors of type < et,e >.
Since the semantic type of antipassive objects is the same as that of common
nouns without determiners, the simplest hypothesis is that antipassive objects are
NPs, projections of nouns which remain of type < e,t > because no determiner has
come along to make them be of type e.27 While Nez Perce does not have overt de-
terminers with which to test this prediction, other languages such as Hungarian are
known to prohibit determiners in their non-referential objects (Farkas and de Swart,
2003). The non-referential nominal is visibly structurally smaller than the referential
DP, lacking at least the D layer. What else remains of the rich functional structure
of nominals (Szabolcsi 1987, Ritter 1991), e.g. the projection(s) associated with f-
features (D´ echaine and Wiltschko 2002)?
The world’s languages vary in whether or not non-referential objects are able to
agree with verbs. In Hindi, such objects agree (Dayal 2003); in Inuktitut, they do not
(Wharram,2003).I proposethat this differenceresults from whether languagesallow
a f-head to occur on the edge of a nominal in the absence of a D head. We know that
f-features and D are tightly linked in many languages. Germanic and Romance lan-
guagesencodebothf anddeﬁnitenessin singlemorphemes,forinstance,andwe ﬁnd
similar correlations in typologically and genetically far-ﬂung languages. In Northern
26 Relational nouns most likely require a higher type (< e,et >), though once supplied with an argument
(forming NP) they are also < e,t >.
27 This analysis requires that individual languages allow both NP and DP arguments. See Pereltsvaig
(2006) for an demonstration of this fact in Russian and other languages.21
Pomo, a Hokan language of Northern California, nominal phrases headed by com-
mon nouns can overtly mark f-features on their right edge only in case an overt
D-element is present (O’Connor 1992: 172-179).28 This marking, which O’Connor
analyzes as a pronoun, is absolutely inseparable from the rest of the nominal and
cannot be stressed, distinguishing itself in these regards from resumptive pronouns.
(38) a. masan
white
maata
woman
(nam)
DEF
D optional
(The) white women
b. masan
white
maata
woman
*(nam)
DEF
phow
3PL
f requires D
Those white women (O’Connor, 1992, 174)
Just asinbetter-knownIndo-Europeancases,thepresenceofaDheadintheNorthern
Pomo DP is tightly linked to the expressionof the nominal’s f-features. Unlike in the
Germanic and Romance cases, Northern Pomo permits the presence of D without f;
it does not, however, allow f without D. The presence of the f-head depends on the
presence of the D head.
What roledoes a f headplayin the grammarof nominals?We mightentertainthe
hypothesisthat this headappearson the edgeof the nominalin orderto allow features
from the noun to be accessible outside the noun phrase. We might posit, therefore,
a locality barrier in the nominal projection, which fP is outside but the N head is
inside. Agreement probes from outside the nominal projection cannot reach all the
way down into the nominal structure to reach N itself; accordingly, nominals project
a fP on their edge. Now, while we cannot directly see a f projection on the edge
of the DP in Nez Perce, the absence of agreement in antipassives can be predicted
straightforwardly if Nez Perce is exactly like Northern Pomo in allowing f to be
projected just in case D is. The antipassive object lacks D, and therefore f cannot be
projected. This is to say that f-probes in the clausal structure (e.g. T29 and the head
responsible for object agreement) will be unable to agree with the antipassive object,
as no f-features are accessible on its edge.30 31
3.3 The structure of extended reﬂexives
In section 3.1 we saw that in terms of scope and referentiality, extended reﬂexive ob-
jects behave like transitive objects. In this section, I present an account of extended
28 Northern Pomo is a head-ﬁnal language.
29 In this paper I refer to the head which controls subject agreement as T. Note that Nez Perce is not a
tenseless language; tense may be seen in (1c), for instance. Tense markers combine with the imperfective
and habitual aspects; present tense is not overtly marked, thus when these markers occur without an overt
tense marker the interpretation is present. The perfective does not combine with tense and always has a
past time interpretation. The perfect also does not combine with tense and has a past time interpretation
with eventive verbs in the absence of higher structure.
30 Note that in such cases the locality barrier in the nominal projection must remain, suggesting that fP
and DP are not responsible for this barrier. Thanks to Omer Preminger for raising this issue.
31 On the broader question of how antipassive clauses are structured in Nez Perce such that the verb
takes a property-type object, see Deal (2007).22
reﬂexives that accounts for their obligatory caselessness while assuming a transitive-
like syntax and semantics. The essence of the accountis that while extendedreﬂexive
clauses are underlyingly transitive, their objects are blocked from agreeing by an
anaphor agreement effect (Rizzi 1990, Woolford 1999). In Nez Perce object nomi-
nals it is generally the case that the possessor is accessible to outside probes in a way
that the overall object nominal is not: the object possessor is externalized and par-
ticipates in verbal agreement instead of the overall object nominal. In the extended
reﬂexiveconstruction,the possessoris a boundvariable.Buildingon workbyKratzer
(to appear), I analyze bound variables as syntactically and semantically featureless.
In an extended reﬂexive clause, the object possessor is the most accessible nominal
for object agreement, closer than (the features of) the overall nominal within which
it resides; agreement targets it, and comes away featureless. This failure of object
agreement is what is responsible for the similarity with the antipassive construction,
and for the overall caselessness of the extended reﬂexive.
The argument to be given has several parts. I ﬁrst argue that extended reﬂexives
involvebinding.Ithenshowthatextendedreﬂexivescomeaboutinexactlythosecon-
texts where object possessor externalizationis to be expected.Accordingly,I propose
that both extended reﬂexive and possessor externalization are grammatical results of
the same fact: in Nez Perce objects, outside probes targetingthe object nominal inter-
act with the possessor, not the overall nominal. I then sketch my analysis in terms of
an anaphor agreement effect. General discussion of the reﬂexive morphology of Nez
Perce and the reasons it is not found in extended reﬂexive constructions can be found
in the appendix.
3.3.1 Binding
The ﬁrst fact to be demonstrated is that the caselessness effect we see in Nez Perce
extendedreﬂexivesis indeed a matter of binding.As expectedon a bindingapproach,
a possessor bound by a quantiﬁcational subject requires caselessness:
(39) ’´ oykala
all
hah´ aacwal
boys
p´ ıke
mother
hi-hetewi-tee’nix.
3SUBJ-love-HAB.PL
All boys love their mothers.
Conﬁgurational evidence backs up the case from variable binding. Caselessness is
required when subject binds object possessor. It is not possible when subject pos-
sessor is coindexed with object. This subject-object binding asymmetry is accounted
for straightforwardly if Nez Perce is underlyingly conﬁgurational, despite its surface
freedom of word order. The subject c-commands the object possessor asymmetri-
cally. The following pair, from adjacent clauses in a traditional story, illustrate this
contrast.32 33
32 As is typical in Nez Perce, pronouns are not expressed overtly in these examples. Speakers often
consider overt pronouns “emphatic”, in keeping with cross-linguistic patterns.
33 The verb root hi ‘say, tell’ in (40b) is phonologically obliterated owing to the presence of stressed
preﬁx p´ ee.23
(40) a. p´ ıst
father
hi-h´ ı-ne
3SUBJ-tell-PERF
She told her father (Phinney, 1934, 71)
[ proi [ told [ proi-GEN father ] ] ]
b. p´ ee-ne
3/3-tell-PERF
pis´ ıt-pim
father-ERG
Her father told her (Phinney, 1934, 71)
[ [ proi-GEN father ] [ told proi] ]
In (40a), where the object possessor is bound by the subject, caselessness ensues. In
(40b), by contrast, the possessor within the subject nominal is coindexed with the
object pronoun, but does not c-command it and hence cannot bind it (in the sense of
Chomsky 1981). Accordingly, the sentence is transitive.
3.3.2 The connection to external possession
Although extended reﬂexive caselessness comes about in a binding conﬁguration,
this conﬁguration is not the most typical context for binding effects: after all, it is
the object possessor that is being bound by the subject, not the object itself. This
distinction is obscured in Nez Perce, however, in virtue of a requirement that object
possessors be expressed as verbal arguments. In the resulting EXTERNAL POSSES-
SION construction, an applicative morpheme, ey’, appears on the verb; the erstwhile
possessor is expressed as direct object, showing case-marking and agreeing with the
verb.34,35 Examples are in (41). (Italics in the English translation mark the nominal
that behavesas directobject.)In(41b),forinstance,verbalagreementregistersa ﬁrst-
person singular object by failing to show overt object agreement at all (see Figure 1);
a third person object (as the overall object ‘my cat’ would be) would have required
the 3/3 preﬁx p´ ee-.
(41) a. ki-nm
this-ERG
h´ aacwal-m
boy-ERG
lik´ ıp
touch
p´ ee-kiy-e’n-ye
3/3-do-APPL2-PERF
’ip-n´ e
3SG-OBJ
samˆ x.
shirt
This boy touched her shirt. (Aoki, 1979, 60)
34 Keeping the focus here on caselessness, I will not have space to fully survey and analyze external
possession constructions in Nez Perce. See Rude (1999) for discussion of external possession in Nez Perce
and closely related Sahaptin.
35 Mandatory possessor externalization, in combination with the language’s rather complex mor-
phophonology, may in some circumstances give the false impression of caselessness. Example (i), ana-
lyzed by Carnie and Cash Cash (2006) as caseless, is such an instance.
(i) p´ oo-pci’yawn-a’y-sa-na
3/3-kill-APPL2-IMPERF-REM.PAST
k´ uks-ne
Cook-OBJ
miy´ a’c.
child
They killed Cook’s son. (Aoki, 1979)
Here vowel harmony combines with a glide reduction rule to obscure the p´ ee- preﬁx on the verb. (Underly-
ingly, the verb ‘kill’ is wep-ci’yaw, ‘with.hand-be.violent’ (Aoki, 1994, 44). /ewe/ ¿ /uu/ is a regular sound
change in Nez Perce, and /uu/ harmonizes to /oo/.) K´ uksne m´ ıya’c is not a constitutent in this structure;
k´ uks-ne is the object, showing object case marking, and miy´ a’c is the caseless theme argument.24
b. ’´ aayat-om
woman-ERG
hi-kiwyek-ey’-kse
3SUBJ-feed-APPL2-IMPERF
’´ ıin-e
1SG-OBJ
p´ ıcpic
cat
c´ uu’yem.
ﬁsh
The woman fed my cat ﬁsh.
c. ’ee-xn-´ ey’-se
3OBJ-see-APPL2-IMPERF
p´ ıke
mother
X-ne.
X-OBJ
I see X’s mother. (Aoki, 1994, 109)
d. kaa
and
w´ aaqo’
now
wept´ ees-ne
eagle-OBJ
sim´ ees
bed
p´ ee-x-yuu-’ey-se-ne
3/3-go-APPL1-APPL2-IMPERF-REM.PAST
weˆ xweq´ e-nm.
frog-ERG
And now the frogs went to the eagle’s bed. (Phinney, 1934, 229)
As examples (41) show, object possessors are expressed externally regardless of
whether the object DP is a theme (41a), a goal (41b),the object of hek´ ı ‘see’ (41c), or
an applicative object (41d). Recall that these are all environments in which extended
reﬂexive caselessness obtains (section 3.1.3).
We have now seen that in each type of clause where extended reﬂexive caseless-
ness is mandatory, object possessor externalization is also mandatory. This suggests
that the same factors that force an object possessor to be expressed as a verbal argu-
ment also force an object possessor that is bound by the subject to bring caselessness
crashingdown on its clause. The tight distributionalconnectionbetweenthe two phe-
nomena extends in both directions. We have seen that in the types of conﬁgurations
where the extended reﬂexive binding pattern brings about caselessness, object pos-
sessor externalization is mandatory. We will see now that where an object possessor
cannot be externalized, caselessness does not ensue if the possessor is bound by the
subject.
In a ditransitive construction, verbal agreement targets the theme, not the goal.
The possessor of the goal can be externalized, (41b), but the possessor of the theme
cannot be; thus (41b) cannot mean ‘The woman fed my ﬁsh to a/the cat’. Where
possessor externalization is not possible from the theme, caselessness does not ensue
if the subject binds the possessor of the theme.
(42) ’´ ıin
1SG
’ew-’n´ ı-ye
3OBJ-give-PERF
’´ ıin-im
1SG-GEN
ciq’´ aamqal
dog
h´ aama-na.
man-OBJ
I gave my dog to the man. (Aoki, 1994, p. 40)
(43) ’iw´ eep-nim
wife-ERG
w´ aaqo’
already
pe-’´ en-ye
3/3-give-PERF
laq´ aas-na
mouse-OBJ
c’ol´ aakstimt.
hand.drum
The wife already gave her hand-drum to the mouse. (Phinney, 1934, 82)
The identical distribution of extended reﬂexive caselessness and possessor exter-
nalization extends to cases where the possessor cannot be expressed externally for
morphological reasons. Nez Perce has two types of possessive marking: an indepen-
dent genitive phrase, as seen above in (42) and schematized in (44), and a form of
synthetic possessor marking, as shown in (45). The synthetic marking is only avail-
able for ﬁrst and second person possessors and only applies to a limited set of nouns,
almost exclusively kinship terms. The two types of possessive marking do not occur
in the same nominal.25
(44) Productive possessive marking:
personal pronoun genitive sufﬁx independent nominal
’iin -im p´ ıst ‘my father’
(45) Special kinship term marking:
possessor preﬁx dependent stem form
na- ’t´ oot ‘my father’
Cases of possessor externalization involve independent nominal forms, and so we
might view externalization as being fed by the analytic possessor forms. Possessor
externalization never leaves a dependent stem form behind: by contrast to (46a), for
instance, we never ﬁnd forms like (46b).
(46) a. hexn-´ ey’-se
see-APPL2-IMPERF
pist
father[free stem]
’imu-n´ e.
2SG-OBJ
I see your father.
b. * hexn-´ ey’-se
see-APPL2-IMPERF
’toot
father[dep stem]
’imu-n´ e.
2SG-OBJ
intended: I see your father.
Again, extended reﬂexive caselessness tracks the possibility of external possession.
When the object possessor is expressed synthetically, possessor externalizationis not
possible and extended reﬂexive caselessness does not come about.
(47) a. q´ o’c
yet
w´ eye
soon
na-’t´ oot-ap
1SG-father-OBJ
’e-s´ eepn’i-yu’.
3OBJ-ask-FUT
Yet soon I will ask my father. (Aoki, 1979, 50)
b. na-’y´ ac-ap
1SG-brother-OBJ
’eeteex
surely
’aw-’y´ aqi-n.
3OBJ-ﬁnd-PERFECT
Surely I found my brother. (Aoki, 1979, 30)
In sum, we have seen that extended reﬂexive caselessness and external possession
have the same distribution. We now turn to an analysis of why this connection should
hold.
3.3.3 Analysis
In the external possession construction, the possessor is treated as a verbal argument;
it is case-marked and agreed with. In addition, the verb bears a special sufﬁx, ey’.36
Independent of external possession, this morpheme behaves like an applicative. In
(48), the most natural interpretation is benefactive: the mean one beneﬁts from the
people’s work. In (49), the most natural interpretation is malefactive: when the geese
spread out, Coyote will drop into the water and presumably drown.
36 This morpheme is subject to allomorphy depending on the following segment; thus it differs from
(48) to (49) given the difference in aspect/mood morphology following.26
(48) [From Cut-Out-of-Belly Boy, Aoki and Walker 1989, 375.] Cut-Out-of-Belly
Boy comes across people who have been enslaved and are pounding sun-
ﬂower seeds. They explain:
’e-kiy´ e-e’y-s-ix
3OBJ-do-APPL2-IMPERF-S.PL
cika’w´ ıis-na.
mean-OBJ
We are doing this for the mean one.
(49) [FromWarmweatherandColdweather,AokiandWalker1989,55.]Thegoose
brothers are carrying Coyote (who has married their sister) on their wings as
they cross the water. After Coyote insults them, the eldest goose says:
kaw´ o’
then
cik’´ ıiw-ne
brother.in.law-OBJ
k’ay’´ ax
spread.out
’e-kiye-´ e’n-ix.
3OBJ-do-APPL2-IMPER
Then spread out on the brother-in-law!
In keeping with the possibility for both benefactive and malefactive interpretations, I
interpretthe ey’ applicativeas introducingan argumentwhich is affected by the event
described by the verb.37
(50) Appl2 (ey’): lxle.affected(x)(e)
I analyze external possession constructions as a special case of the applicative con-
struction. The possessor moves from within the object nominal to the speciﬁer of the
applicative. It is interpreted in two places: as a possessor, due to its interpretation
in the nominal, and as an affected party, due to its interpretation as the applicative’s
argument.
(51) ’icey´ eeye-ne
coyote-OBJ
s´ ılu
eye
p´ ee-’nehweec-ey’-six.
3/3-dance-APPL-IMPERF.PL
They are dancing with coyote’s eyes. (Aoki and Walker, 1989, 146)
(52) ApplP
DP-poss Appl2
Appl VP
V DP⋆
DP-poss DP
NP
The externalpossession cases like (51)differfromthe pureapplicativecases like (48)
in that they recycle an already-interpreted nominal as the applicative argument.38
37 This reﬂects a very common affectedness requirement in external possession cross-linguistically
(Payne and Barshi 1999, O’Connor 2007).
38 This derivation requires that there be no extraction prohibition on possessors in Nez Perce, and in-
deed it appears that there is not. Possessors may appear separated from nouns, though they only do so
infrequently in corpora.27
I analyze the similarity between extended reﬂexive constructions and external
possession constructionsas coming about due to the status of the possessor inside the
object nominal in the two cases.39 If the possessor is to be externalized in a case like
(51), it must be accessible to outside probes that drive movement. Suppose that in a
structure like (52) the probe is Appl, as seems reasonable. When Appl probes into its
sister, it ignores DP⋆ (the overall object nominal) in favor of the possessor DP inside
of it. This suggests that within the object nominal, the possessor’s features are closer
to an outside probe than the overall object nominal’s features are.40
This gives us the structure we need to explain why caselessness obtains in an ex-
tendedreﬂexive.Theobject possessor’s featuresare always closer to an outsideprobe
than the overall object’s features are. The grammar does not generally allow probes
to target the overall nominal and agree with it if a possessor is present; the posses-
sor intervenes. Now suppose that the possessor is a bound variable. What does this
mean for its agreement behavior? In order to agree, we demand only that at the point
in the derivation where the agreement takes place, the bound variable has features
that it may share with the agreement probe. Yet recent work on the morphosemantics
of binding has revealed that bound variables often present instances of morphology-
semantics mismatch; in many cases, the features that we infer from the morphology
of bound items are not themselves semantically interpreted on the bound items. This
can be seen cases of ”fake indexicals” as in (53).
(53) Only you eat what you cook.
Onereadingofthisexampletreatsthe secondinstanceofyou,ostensiblyanindexical,
as a bound variable: you are the only x such that x eats what x cooks. This bound
variable ranges not only over second persons (those being addressed by (53)), but
over relevant individuals more generally. How is this bound variable semantics to be
reconciled with the visible person features of you?
(i) kaa
and
w´ aaqo’
now
’ips´ uus-x
hand-to
kike’t
blood
hi-’npi-me
3SUBJ-take-PERF.CI
’icweew’lcix-nim.
monster-GEN
And now he took the monster’s blood on his hands. (Phinney, 1934, 25)
(ii) ke
REL
’im-´ eem
3PL-GEN
tim’´ uune
bow
pist
father
’e-pe-wc’ee-ye
3POSS.S-S.PL-become-PERF
those whose father became a bow (Aoki and Walker, 1989, 137)
39 Note that extended reﬂexive is not derived from external possession, but rather the two are made
possible by the same fact about the structure of possessed object nominals.
40 Since DP⋆ dominates DP-poss, on standard assumptions about c-command, neither c-commands the
other. If locality is calculated in terms of closest c-command, the two potential goals should count as
equidistant from higher probes. There is a choice of conclusions to draw from this. Perhaps the most
modest, accepting equidistance between DP-poss and DP⋆, is to conclude that such equidistance must be
resolvable in favor of agreement with DP-poss in at least some conﬁgurations. A second possible move
is to reject the equidistance between DP-poss and DP⋆ by adopting a revised version of c-command,
for instance Kayne’s (1994). A third possibility is to eschew equidistance by rejecting the premise that
agreement targets DP. If it is fP that is targeted by agreement, as proposed above, then it may be possible
to treat the fP within DP-poss as closer to outside probes than the fP within DP⋆. Of course, this option
depends on the possibility of fP within DP-poss being ”closer to the top” than fP within DP⋆, a proposal
that requires a non-uniform functional structure for nominals (pace Cinque 1999). Ileave the choice among
these options to future research.28
On the basis of (53) and a range of related examples, Kratzer (1998, to appear)
has argued that bound variables can be represented in the syntax, and interpreted by
the semantics, without any f-features at all. What apparent features they have can be
assigned to them in post-interpretationmorphology/morphosyntax.If this is the case,
we might understand what comes about when the object agreement probe comes
across the bound variable possessor as follows: the probe ﬁnds a nominal (perhaps
the index feature which comprises the bound variable, in Kratzer’s terms), but it does
not ﬁnd any f-features to share. Object agreement, in the sense of f-feature transfer,
fails in extended reﬂexives. The closest nominal to the object agreement probe has
no f-bundle to share with the probe.41
This explanationfor the failure of object agreementin Nez Perce extendedreﬂex-
ives renders them an example of the ANAPHOR AGREEMENT EFFECT (Rizzi, 1990).
As pointed out in Rizzi’s original discussion of the topic, effects attributable only to
aninabilityofanaphorstoagree,andnottootherfacetsofthebindingtheory,areseen
in the grammar of Italian, exempliﬁed below. The Italian verb piacere ‘like/please’
takes a (non-agreeing) dative subject and a nominative object, which agrees with the
verb.42
(54) A
to
loro
3PL.DAT
piaccio
please.1SG
io.
I.NOM
They like me.
If the nominative object is an anaphor, however, agreement is blocked, (55). Such
examples only become grammatical if verbal agreement switches to a default 3SG
form, (56).
(55) * Mi
me
piaccio
please-1SG
me stesso.
myself
intended: I like myself.
(56) ? Mi
me
piace
please-3SG
me stesso.
myself
I like myself.
What we see in these examples is an inability of bound variable nominals to share f-
features with agreement probes. The Italian pattern is quite similar to what we have
seen for Nez Perce above. If a nominative object (in Italian) or an object possessor
(in Nez Perce) is not a bound variable, it participates in agreement. However, like
the Italian nominative object, if the Nez Perce object possessor is a bound variable, it
cannot participate in agreement. In this case, the probe responsible for object agree-
ment probes the possessor nominal, but this nominal does not share f-features with
the probe. Accordingly, there are no f-features to realize as object agreement.
Work by Woolford (1999) has shown that anaphor agreement effects are found
in a variety of unrelated languages. Woolford notes that one of two things happens
41 This treatment presupposes that Agree operates before the post-syntactic operations that give speak-
able f-features to bound variables. I assume here that Agree operates in ”narrow syntax” and is realized in
the morphological component, as is commonly but not universally (e.g. Bobaljik 2005) assumed.
42 Thanks to Ilaria Frana for help with the Italian data.29
cross-linguistically when agreement attempts to target an anaphor: the agreement
goes simply missing, or it assumes a special ”anaphoric” form. I interpret this latter
optionas comingaboutwhena languagehas a way ofexpressingagreementthat does
not depend on having any f-features to express. The agreement head can only mark
that it has agreed, but cannotgive any particulars of the item that it has agreedwith.43
44
In overview, I propose that the structure of extended reﬂexive constructions is
parallel to the structure of transitives. The difference between the two comes about
due to the inability of the object possessor to agree. It is generally the case in Nez
Perce that within object nominals, possessors are accessible to outside probes in a
way that possessed nominals are not. This allows possessors to be externalized and
to participate in object agreement.
When the possessor is a bound variable, however, any probe that seeks to agree
with it will ﬁnd no f-features to share. Therefore, no object agreement is realized in
the extended reﬂexive. This anaphor agreement effect has ramiﬁcations for the case
system. Although a case-marking contrast is not visible in the Italian data, presum-
ably because nominative is equivalent to the absence of morphological case, case-
marking in Nez Perce tracks the agreement facts entirely. When the object can agree,
it is marked for case. When it cannot (e.g. as the theme argument in a ditransitive), it
remains caseless. The inability of objects to agree is what unites the extended reﬂex-
ive construction and the antipassive in Nez Perce, providing for their uniﬁed case-
lessness in spite of their syntactic and semantic differences.
3.4 Summary
Our exploration of caseless clauses converges on object agreement as the factor re-
sponsible for transitivity in the sense relevant to Nez Perce ergative case. We have
seen that where object agreement is blocked due to the absence of fP (as in antipas-
sives) or an anaphor agreement effect (as in extended reﬂexives), both subject and
object case-marking disappear. For object case-marking, this ﬁnding is not surpris-
ing; case and agreement go together for the object (as they do for subjects in many
languages). But the sensitivity of the subject case to object agreement remains the
special quirk of the ergative system, the core of its transitivity effect.
In the sections that follow we move toward a formalization of the transitivity
effect, ﬁrst considering what criterion of subjecthood it is best combined with, and
ultimately proposinga morphologicalanalysis of the case system according to which
the ergative case is a spell-out result of object agreement.
43 In Deal (2008a), the special, underspeciﬁed form of agreement found with reﬂexives in Warlpiri is
proposed to derive from the presence of only a [D] feature on bound variable objects.
44 Note that for Nez Perce it is not possible to examine the agreement properties of anaphors that are not
embedded in other nominals (e.g. anaphor objects bound by the subject) given that the language requires
detransitivization whenever possible in reﬂexives. Data and argumentation can be found in the appendix.30
4 The subjecthood criterion
The task is now to put together what we have learned about the transitivity condition
with a condition on subjecthood. To do so, we must choose between several con-
ceptions of subjecthood which are in many cases equivalent: the agent; the argument
belonging to the highest argument-structural speciﬁer position within an extended
verbal projection; or the argument entering into an agreement relation with higher
functional structure. I ﬁrst show that ergative is not restricted to agents in Nez Perce.
I then show that we cannot adopt a purely argument-structuralnotion of subjecthood
on the grounds of evidence from causatives.
4.1 Ergative is not the case of agents
A characterization of ergative as the case of transitive subjects stands in empirical
opposition to a view of ergative as the case of (transitive) agents. In particular, we
can distinguish between a view according to which ergative is a structural case for
transitive subjects (i.e. a case assigned given a particular syntactic conﬁguration),
and one according to which it is an inherent case for agent arguments (i.e. a case
assigned given a particular theta-role), as proposed by Woolford (1997).45
Inthe idealsituationforaninherentcaseview,ergativeis licensedorassignedjust
in case the argument to which it is assigned receives the agent theta-role. However,
this is not the situation in Nez Perce. Ergative case appears on transitive subjects
that lack the characteristic properties of agents, e.g. animacy and volition, or are
standardly assumed to hold q-roles other than agent. In Nez Perce, the ergative case
is realized on transitive subjects even if these are subjects of psych-verbs:
(57) p´ aa-ckaw-ca
3/3-fear-IMPERF
ciq’´ aamqal-na
dog-OBJ
picp´ ıc-nim
cat-ERG
m´ eet’u
but
p´ ee-tewi-se
3/3-like-IMPERF
ciq’´ aamqal-nim
dog-ERG
picp´ ıc-ne.
cat-OBJ
The cat is afraid of the dog but the dog likes the cat.
(58) pit’´ ıi-nm
girl-ERG
pee-cic´ eqe-ce
3/3-be.interested-IMPERF
titwat´ ıi-ne.
story-OBJ
The girl is interested in the story.
(59) w´ eet’u
NEG
kon´ ıx
thenceforth
’´ aatway-nim
old.woman-ERG
p´ ee-cimx-ne
3/3-hate-PERF
t’ext’´ ex-ne.
locust-OBJ
The old woman didn’t hate the (young woman) Locust anymore. (Phinney,
1934, 115)
Non-agentive causer subjects are treated the same way:
(60) p´ uu-ye-sitk-en’-ye
3/3-quickly-entangle-APPL2-PERF
w´ eyux
leg
hop´ oop-nim.
moss-ERG
The moss entangled her legs. (Phinney, 1934, 16)
45 The link between ergativity and agentivity has been a topic in the typological literature for quite some
time; see Comrie (1978), and for a recent recap, Bruening (2007).31
(61) Context: discussion of a car wreck atop Lewiston Hill. In dense fog, a small
car crashed into a large truck hauling cars to a dealership.
him´ eeqiis-nim
big-ERG
’aatam´ ooc-nim
car-ERG
p´ oo-yawq-na
3/3-wreck-PERF
kuck´ uc-ne
little-OBJ
’aatam´ ooc-na.
car-OBJ
The big car wrecked the little car.
Comment: ”caused him to get in a wreck”
So too are natural forces and even what seem to be undergoers:
(62) hahatyan-´ oo-sa
be.windy-APPL1-IMPERF
’icewe’´ ıis-nim
cold-ERG
h´ aatya-nm.
wind-ERG
Cold wind is blowing towards me. (Aoki, 1994, 100)
(63) taˆ xc
soon
’ee
2SG
hi-tqew´ eeleylek-e’n-yu’
3SUBJ-ﬂow.into-APPL2-FUT
mac’´ ayo
ear
k´ uus-nim.
water-ERG
Water will ﬂow into your ears. (Aoki and Walker, 1989, 112)
(64) pisw´ e-m
rock-ERG
in´ ıi-ne
house-OBJ
pee-tqilik´ eece-ye.
3/3-fall.on-PERF
A rock fell on the house.
In all these examples, ergative case tracks transitive subjects (where subjecthood is
determined by subject agreement) but not necessarily agents. A strict version of the
agency proposal undergenerates, in that it predicts that non-agentive subjects should
lack the ergative case. This issue is anticipated in Woolford 1997, where it is noted
that ”although the correlation between ergative Case and the agent theta role is not
perfect, it is as close as the correlation between dative and goals/experiencers is” (p.
182). What I want to claim here is that this imperfect correlation between agency and
ergativein Nez Perce arises becauseof thewell-knownimperfectcorrelationbetween
agency and subjecthood.46 The predictive power of our theory is not enhanced by a
view of ergative as a case for agents that is nevertheless sometimes assigned to non-
agents.
4.2 Ergative is not thanks to v alone
We turn now to a second potential conception of subject: the subject is that nom-
inal that occupies the highest argument-structural position in a verbal projection.
Such a conception is suggested by a family of recent proposals that treat ergative
case as an inherent case whose assignment is controlled purely by v (e.g. Wool-
ford 2006, Aldridge 2004, Legate 2002, 2006, 2008, Anand and Nevins 2006). On
such a treatment, we might propose that the transitivity condition in Nez Perce re-
duces to a choice between two v heads. One requires object agreement and assigns
ergative (”transitive v”); the other is incompatible with agreement and with ergative
46 As Comrie (1978) put it: ”It should be noted initially that there is bound to be a high correlation
between ergative noun phrases and agentive noun phrases simply because As [transitive subjects] are
typically high on the scale of agentivity.”32
(”intransitive v”).47 48 I will refer to this intermediate hypothesis as the ‘Agreeing v’
hypothesis.
(65) Agreeing v hypothesis:
The difference between transitive and intransitive clauses lies in the syntax
of the v head only. Transitive v but not intransitive v participates in object
agreement and assigns/licenses ergative case to its speciﬁer.
Before we test this hypothesis, we will need to make speciﬁc the means by which
object agreement is encoded in grammar. My treatment of agreement is purely syn-
tactic.49 It appears that object agreement is in principle available to any but the high-
est argument in an argument-structural projection; agreeing objects include not only
themes but also goals in ditransitives and applicative objects. However, only one
agreeing object is allowed per external argument. We can propose then that object
agreement features are bundled with the highest argument-introducinghead in a ver-
bal projection:
(66) vP
DPsubj vP
v: uf VP
V DPobj : f
Here v is the highest argument-introducinghead. The agreement feature on this head
consists of an unvalued f-bundle that receives its value through agreement with the
closest c-commanded nominal. In (66) I have shown this as a theme argument; were
another argument introduced above the theme, such as a goal or an applicative ar-
gument, this argument would be closer to the uf probe and in consequence control
object agreement.
Here is how we might come to the Agreeing v hypothesis: if object agreement
features come bundled with the highest-argument structural head, and the argument
introducedby thatheadends upbeingthe subject,couldwe notreducethetransitivity
conditionon ergativecase to this lucky coincidencein vP structure? Ergativesubjects
would be just those subjects originating in a vP with fully valued f-features.
YetevidencefromcausativesspeaksagainsttheAgreeingvhypothesis.Thecausative
construction with transitive verbs is the only case I know of in Nez Perce where we
47 On some models of this variety, transitive and intransitive v are also taken to differ in whether they
combine with a transitive verb (e.g. Legate 2006). However, as we have seen, the v-model does not allow
us any real notion of transitivity/intransitivity in verbs themselves.
48 Note that on this approach, agreement and case features are both directly encoded in the syntax, with
no obvious connection between them.
49 This is necessitated by my treatment of bound variables as syntactically featureless. Agreement must
apply before the morphological processes that give speakable (but not interpretable) features to bound
variables.33
see two independent case-marked objects within a single clause: the embedded sub-
ject (the ‘causee’) bears objective case, and so can the object of the verb (the ‘under-
lying object’):
(67) s´ ıisel
C
kaa
and
m´ arsi-na
M-OBJ
’e-n´ ee-sepe-twik-ce
3OBJ-O.PL-CAUSE-accompany-IMPERF
c´ eeki-ne.
J-OBJ
I make Cecil and Marcie accompany Jackie. (Crook, 1999, p 180)
The plural object agreement we see here reﬂects agreement with the causee, ‘Cecil
and Marcie’. The presence of the agreement morpheme indicates a syntactic agree-
ment relation between the causee and the highest v, that introducing the (ergative)
causer argument.
What about the lower v, introducing the causee? While there is no agreement
morpheme spelling out agreement between this head and the verbal object in (67),
there are several indications that the verbal object has participated in Agree. The ﬁrst
hint is the case marking on the verbal object; recall that object case is elsewhere
conditioned on object agreement in Nez Perce. And strikingly, just as for a typical
object, if the underlying object is indeﬁnite, it may be an antipassive object and lose
case (the causee argument in (68) is pro):
(68) ’e-sep´ ee-q’uyim-se
3OBJ-CAUSE-climb-IMPERF
tewl´ ıikt.
tree
I make him climb a tree. (Crook, 1999, 179)
(69) Harold-nim
H-ERG
p´ ee-sepe-wemsi-se
3/3-CAUSE-borrow-IMPERF
s´ ık’em
horse
Lini-ne.
L-OBJ
Harold is having Lindy borrow a horse (lending a horse to Lindy).
We have seen above that the correlation between caselessness and indeﬁniteness in
Nez Perce is due to the inability of property-type objects to agree, supporting the
contention that object agreement targets the underlying object in causative construc-
tions. Moreover, just as in a non-causative, if the causee binds the possessor of the
underlying object, the underlying object must be caseless:
(70) a. Payton-ne
P-OBJ
p´ ee-sepe-tim’in-e
3/3-CAUSE-write-PERF
we’n´ ıkt.
name
She made Paytoni write hisi name.
b. Payton-ne
P-OBJ
p´ ee-sepe-tim’in-e
3/3-CAUSE-write-PERF
we’nik´ ı-ne.
name-OBJ
She made Payton write a/the name.
Comment: ”if you say we’nikine, it’s just a name, not his name.”
Thus we ﬁnd the equivalent of both antipassive and extended reﬂexive constructions
in causatives. If the conditions on object caselessness are linked to object agreement,
as I have argued above, this pattern strongly suggests object agreement with the un-
derlying object in a causative construction. An Agree relation obtains, but no agree-
ment is spelled-out: why? The reasons for the non-expression of this object agree-
ment may be templatic; they may be due to the potential intervention of the lower34
object agreement between the verb and derivational morphology (the causative); or,
as Henry Davis suggests, they may derive from a haplological or OCP-like process.
Accounting for the possibility of two agreement heads, and two agents, in Nez
Perce causatives, I adopt a structure as follows:
(71) Structure of causativized transitives
vP
causer vP
v: uf CAUSE-P
CAUSE vP
causee vP
v: uf VP
V object
This structure follows Parsons (1990), Pylkk¨ anen (2002), Kratzer (2005) and others
in positing a head CAUSE that introduces a causing event, not a causer individual;
the causer argument is introduced by agent-introducing v above CAUSE. The struc-
ture below CAUSE contains a complete argument-structural projection for the verb.
Accordingly,object agreementis present on the highest head of the verb’s projection.
Object agreement is also present on the higher v head, the highest head of the overall
argument-structural projection for the causative construction. The higher agreement
head is realized morphologically while the lower one is not, though we can diagnose
its presence via patterns of case-marking on the underlying object.
Giventhat the underlyingobject is an agreeingobject in cases like (67)and (70b),
the lower vP will end up with fully valued f-features. The Agreeing v Hypothesis
leadsustoexpectthatergativecasewouldbeassignedtothespeciﬁerofthislowervP,
therefore.If ergativecase is assigned to any argumentin the speciﬁer of a v head with
fully valued f-features, the causee argument in transitive causatives should receive
ergative case. But this is impossible. The causee argument must receive objective
case.
Theconsequenceisthatwecannotdeﬁnesubjecthoodpurelyargument-structurally,
at least so far as ergative case is concerned. The relevant conception of transitive
subject must make reference to the higher functional structure often taken to deﬁne
subjecthood, i.e. T (or whatever other head is responsible for subject agreement, e.g.
I/AgrS).50 We can then generalize the following condition on Nez Perce ergative
50 A reviewer suggests that the Agreeing v Hypothesis may be still be tenable if ergative is due to a v
head which must be selected for by agreeing T. Note, however, that this selection would have to operate at
a distance, as v and T may be separated by aspect, space marking (see Deal Forthcoming) and potentially
adverb-related projections as well.35
case, the distillation of what it means for ergative to target transitive subjects in this
language:51 52
(72) Transitive subject condition on Nez Perce ergative:
The ergative case is realized on the nominal agreeing with T just in case it
originates in a vP whose head has fully-valued f-features.
Condition (72) expresses the core transitivity fact uncovered in section 3: the tran-
sitive clause is the clause with successful object agreement. It also expresses the
fact uncovered in this section that subjecthood cannot be deﬁned purely argument-
structurally,at the risk of predictingergativecase on causee arguments.Further,these
twoaspects ofthegeneralizationaretiedtogetherviathevP layerin whichthesubject
originates.
Thegeneralizationestablished,the followingsection offersa lookat how a theory
of Nez Perce case may be implemented such that condition (72) is captured. We
will see that it is possible to capture Nez Perce case marking without ﬂavors of v
(i.e. v heads that differ syntactically but not semantically), a stipulated connection
between ergative and object agreement, or indeed any syntactic primitive ‘ergative
case’, simplifying the commitments of the Agreeing v theory while at the same time
improving its empirical coverage.
5 Ergative as subject and object agreement
What is ergative case, that it should be constrained by both subject and object agree-
ment?
It is clear from our discussion of caselessness that neither subject case nor object
case is correlated with syntactic licensing in Nez Perce (see also Marantz 1991).
Subjects appear without case at the whim of objects. Objects appear without case
when a structurally superior object claims the sole object case-marker (e.g. the theme
yields the case-marker to the goal in a ditransitive) and when they cannot agree (as in
antipassives and extended reﬂexives). If one is committed to an abstract Case theory
regulating the licensing of nominals, one is left to conclude that abstract Case does
not correlate with morphological case in Nez Perce. Notably, morphological case
has to do with agreement, whereas abstract Case qua licensing is independent of
agreement.53
That the ergative case is not an abstract Case popularly construed still leaves
open whether it is assigned (in whatever sense) in the syntax or in the morphology.54
51 This generalization abstracts away from cases like (64) where the subject is an undergoer. On these,
see note 58.
52 Stepping away from the Agreeing v hypothesis, we are no longer forced to posit multiple syntaxes
(”ﬂavors”) for external-argument introducing v in Nez Perce. The semantics of introducing an agent need
correspond only to a single syntactic encoding: [uf] features are always present on that v that introduces
external arguments in Nez Perce. When they fail to obtain a value via agreement, they are discarded by the
morphology.
53 On this latter point, see also Davis and Matthewson (2003).
54 This dichotomy presupposes a view of grammar where syntactic and morphological components or
processes are distinguished. Among scholars granting this distinction, the morphological view here is at36
I pursue a morphological account here for a number of reasons. First, it does not
appear that ergative and objective case-markers are semantically interpreted in Nez
Perce; they do not correlate with agency or aktionsart, as subject and object case-
markers in various languages have sometimes been claimed to do (on the former, see
section 4.1; on the latter, Kiparsky 1998, Kratzer 2004). Thus, if case information
were present in the syntax, it would be entirely uninterpretable at LF – both on the
assigner and on the recipient. A principle like Full Interpretation (Chomsky, 1995)
militates against the inclusion of such features in the syntax.
Second, the dependency of subject case on object agreement is unexpected if
case and agreement are checked/valued for subject and object in familiar ways, i.e.
through separate mechanisms for subject and for object. Standard assumptions hold
the T/I/AgrS head responsible for both subject case and agreement, and a lower
v/m/AgrO head responsible for both object case and agreement (i.a. Johnson 1991);
whatever speciﬁc labels and assumptions one adopts, it is not obvious how the two
syntactic systems can be related to each other while preserving the syntactic function
for which they were intended. But explaining the dependencyof ergative case on ob-
ject agreement in Nez Perce calls for just this sort of link. We should thus not take
it to be a ”cheap” or default position to locate the ergative case within the syntactic
component. Rather, it introduces a notable point of variation into this system: some-
times the subject’s case feature is valued by T, and sometimes other considerations
are necessary.
The ﬁnal reason for pursuinga morphologicalaccount is that it allows us to adopt
a kind of reductionism about ergative, and indeed about case in general. Using the
tools made available by a Distributed Morphology-style morphology, such as I pur-
sue here, we are able to dispense entirely with the primitive ‘ergative case’ in favor
of a combination of independently motivated syntactic features. These features are
manipulated by the syntax and interpreted by the morphology.One way that the mor-
phology can interpret features resulting from agreement, for instance, is as nominal
case. Nominal case is related to verbal agreement because case is just a form of
spell-out of agreement.55 We do not need to accord cases the status of theoretical
primitives. I take this to be an important theoretical virtue.
The crucial steps for the implementation here are syntactic agreement and late
insertion. Unlike so-called ”Case features”, the features involved in agreement are
interpretable on the nominal from which they originate, avoiding the Full Interpre-
tation problem outlined for Case above. What I will try to do here is let the ”syn-
taxiness” of case-marking fall out of its dependence on a fully syntactic system of
agreement. This emerges via a theory of the architecture of the morphological inter-
face which assumes late insertion, here Distributed Morphology (Halle and Marantz
1993, Harley and Noyer 1999). In this model, the syntax manipulates abstract fea-
ture bundles which are realized in the morphological component with Vocabulary
Items, i.e. pairs of phonological features and morphosyntactic features. Vocabulary
present the minority position; a recent defense of the morphological position can be found in McFadden
(2004).
55 This approach has also been pursued by Platzack (2006), though the present proposal was developed
independently. Platzack proposes that several difﬁcult case paradigms in Icelandic can be accounted for by
treating case as the spell out of agreement. Related ideas can also be found in Haeberli (2001, 300-301).37
Item compete for insertion at a syntactic node, and the item that matches the greatest
number of the node’s features without conﬂicting or overspecifying is inserted.
We begin with the agreeing object. Recall that the object bears case only if it
agrees. This means the morphology must have access to whether or not a nominal
has agreed. We can capture this by supposing that agreement in the syntax is essen-
tially the establishment of a sharing relation between f-features. Those nominals and
agreement heads that have agreed in the syntax are passed to the morphology with
shared f-features. To make sure that nominals agreeing with v can be marked differ-
ently from those agreeing with T, we must allow that nominals which have agreed
are passed to the morphology with an indication of which head they have agreed
with. I indicate this here by annotating the agreeing f-bundle with the category of its
agreement source.56 I indicate sharing of f features by coindexation.
(73) a. Before agreement
vP
DPsubj vP
v: uf XP
V DPobj : f1
b. After agreement
vP
DPsubj vP
v: f1-v XP
V DPobj : f1-v
The morphology interprets the structure in (73bb) in two ways: it spells-out the f-
features on v, resulting in object agreement, and it marks the DP by assigning it a
case-marker. The objective case-marker is inserted as the spell out of a f-bundle an-
notated v on a D head;57 the object agreement markers spell out f-features annotated
v otherwise.
(74) Vocabulary Item for objective case marker
[f-v], [D]
Phonology: /ne/
56 This system produced is in a sense notationally similar to the approach pursued by Pesetsky and
Torrego (2007), in that when T agrees with a nominal, the nominal’s f bundle is annotated T, and the
spell-out of this annotation may concern case. However, my system differs from Pesetsky and Torrego’s in
that I do not take it that case is established in the syntax, and thus do not equate the T annotation with case
or link it to licensing.
57 The [D] feature here serves the same role as McFadden (2004)’s [+case] feature, viz to distinguish a
dependent-marker (case) from a head-marker (agreement).38
(75) Sample Vocabulary Item for object agreement: plural
[pl-v]
Phonology: /nees/
A non-agreeing object, in virtue of not having received the v annotation via agree-
ment, will not be a candidate for insertion of the objective case marker. This is be-
cause the objective case-marker Vocabulary Item is overspeciﬁed for the realization
of a f-bundle which is simply unannotated [f]. I assume that morphemes may only
spell out features that belong to the nodes they realize (Halle and Marantz 1993).The
objective case-marker, if asked to spell out a non-agreeing object’s f-bundle, would
spell out f-features in addition to an annotation v not present in the input, a result
that is barred.
We turn next to the mechanisms of subject agreement. Following the conventions
above, we can establish a structure like (76) for the transitive clause subsequent to
agreement.
(76) After agreement in the transitive clause (ﬁrst take)
TP
T: [f1-T] vP
DPsubj: [f1-T] vP
v: [f2-v] XP
V DPobj : [f2-v]
This structure brings us quite close to the generalization in (72). We can now capture
the subject as that nominal with a [f-T] bundle, and the transitive subject as that
nominal with [f-T] that occupies the speciﬁer of a head marked [f-v], i.e. the head
marked with the features of the object attained via agreement.
Now, as things stand in (76), the transitive subject is deﬁned in part featurally
(via its [f-T] bundle) and in part conﬁgurationally(i.e. it must reside in the Spec of a
particular kind of head). This differs from the transitive object, which we saw above
can be deﬁned purely featurally, via its [f-v] feature. It was in virtue of the purely
featural deﬁnition of transitive object that we were able to formulate the object case
Vocabulary Item as in (74). Like other material inserted in the morphological com-
ponent, the objective case marker is chosen for insertion based on feature matching
between the syntactic node to be realized and the morphological material available
in the language (Halle and Marantz, 1993). It seems, then, advantageous to pursue a
purely featural deﬁnition of transitive subject as well.
Only one further detail is necessary to make the category of transitive subject one
that can be singled out featurally by the morphological component: we must allow
that the agreement marker on v be passed to the speciﬁer of vP. Some precedent
for doing so comes from the literature on so-called inherent case, i.e. that nominal
marking that is directly correlated with thematic information (Woolford, 1997, i.a.).39
An inherent case-marked nominal receives its marking in virtue of the argument-
structural position in which it originates. This means that there must be a means
of in situ feature-sharing between speciﬁer and head positions within the argument
structural projection,such that the speciﬁer nominal may be appropriatelymarked by
the argument-structural head – that is, there must be made available some form of
in situ Spec-head agreement. While there has been contention over the instances in
which cases should be analyzed as theta-related (including some earlier in this very
paper), it is accepted that thematic information can play a role in case-marking at
least in some languages, some of the time; we should note, then, that the possibility
of Spec-head agreement makes a link between case and thematic information at least
possible.And if Spec-headagreementis to becountenancedin inherentcase systems,
the simplest explanation is that it is in fact generally available. This allows us to
explain the relevance of object agreement for the subject nominal: the agreement
feature that the v head obtains from the object is shared with the subject.58
(77) After agreement in the transitive clause (ﬁnal take)
TP
T: [f1-T] vP
DPsubj: [f1-T], [f2-v] vP
v: [f2-v] XP
V DPobj : [f2-v]
We can now give a featural deﬁnition of the transitive subject, and accordingly, a
vocabulary entry for the ergative case morpheme:
(78) Vocabulary Item for ergative case marker:
[f-T],[f-v], [D]
Phonology: /nm/
This Vocabulary Item can only be inserted on a nominal that has received agreement
features from both T and v: the transitive subject.
58 In a case like (64) where the subject is an undergoer, it plausibly obtains a position in the speciﬁer
of vP by movement. I surmise that this movement is motivated by a need to move to the edge of the vP
phase and accordingly is driven by Agree/agreement with vP. On this proposal the subject of (64) agrees
with both v and T under c-command. (I take it that our theory should not generally bar multiple heads from
agreeing with the same goal in this way; see Deal (to appear).) Henry Davis suggests that, alternatively,
what we could be seeing in these facts is a requirement that all agreement processes that underlie case
morphology take place in a Spec-head conﬁguration. On this account, the subject would agree with v from
the speciﬁer position of vP and subsequently move to the speciﬁer position of TP. Note that the vocabulary
entry for ergative case is appropriately neutral on how the subject comes to obtain both T- and v-marked
features.40
6 Sahaptin
An interestingtwist on theNez Perce patternis foundin Sahaptin,a familyof dialects
closely related to Nez Perce (but not mutually intelligible with it). In Sahaptin, the
presenceofan ergativecase markeronthe subject is dependenton the personfeatures
of both subject and object. The two languages differ in the precise vocabulary item
for the ergative case marker, but the mechanism by which the grammar produces
ergativity is the same.
Our formalization of the transitivity condition on Nez Perce ergative leads us to
predict the possibility of languages where the form or presence of an ergative case
markeris sensitivetothegrammaticalfeaturesoftheobject,notjust themerefact that
the object agrees. Sahaptin is precisely such a language: in Sahaptin, ergative case is
only expressed on a 3rd person singular subject in the presence of a 1st or 2nd person
object.(Note thatthe object is pro in (80).Its personinformationis easily recoverable
via the second position clitic; however, this clitic does not express distinctions of
case.)59
(79) i-tuˆ xn´ a-na=aˇ s
3SUBJ-shoot-ASP=1SG
w´ ınˇ s-nim
man-ERG
(´ ına).
1SG.ACC
The man shot me. (Rude, 1985, 144)
(80) 1w´ ınˇ s-nim=naˇ s
man-ERG=1SG
i-q’´ ınun-a.
3SUBJ-see-PAST
The man saw me. (Rude, 1997, ex 25)
(81) x
˙
w1saat-n1m=naˇ s
old.man-ERG=1SG
i-n´ ı-ya
3SUBJ-give-PAST
in´ ay
1SG.ACC
k’´ usi.
horse
The old man gave me a horse. (Rigsby and Rude, 1996, 674)
A third person subject with a third person object takes no ergative marking. In the
followingcases bothtransitive(82)andintransitive(83)clausesshowthesameverbal
agreement and form of the subject, despite the presence of an accusative object in
(82).
(82) 1w´ ınˇ s
man
i-q’´ ınun-a
3SUBJ-see-PAST
miy´ anaˇ s-na.
child-ACC
The man saw the child. (Rude, 1997, ex 26)
(83) i-wiy´ anawi-ya
3SUBJ-arrive-PAST
1w´ ınˇ s.
man
The man arrived. (Rude, 1997, ex 2)
59 In Sahaptin examples I provide the name of the Sahaptin dialect if provided by the source. Some
slight dialect differences are seen in the data below, e.g. the varying form of ‘man’ in (79) versus the other
examples; following Rude (1997) and Rigsby and Rude (1996), I assume that Sahaptin dialects behave
alike in the phenomena discussed here.
Abbreviations in Sahaptin glosses are 3SUBJ 3rd person subject agreement, 3OBJ 3rd person object agree-
ment, ASP aspect, IMPERF imperfective aspect, APPL applicative, ERG ergative case, ACC accusative case.41
ThispatterncanbeexplainedifwesupposethatobjectagreementinSahaptinpro-
ceeds just as it does in Nez Perce. Just like in Nez Perce, 1st/2nd person object agree-
ment is not phonologically overt. Furthermore, in the presence of 3rd person subject
agreement, 3rd person object agreement is not overt in Sahaptin either (thus with Sa-
haptin (82) cf. Nez Perce p´ e-ex-ne, 3/3-see-PERF, ‘He saw him’). Object agreement
is in fact only overtif the object is 3rd person and the subject is 1st/2nd person. There
is also no object number agreement in Sahaptin.
(84) tut´ a-p=aˇ s
your.father-ACC=1SG
´ a-q’inu-ˇ san-a.
3OBJ-see-IMPERF-PAST
I saw your father. (Columbia River Sahaptin, Rude 1997)
(85) ´ aw-ani-yay-a=aˇ s
3OBJ-make-APPL-PAST=1SG
k’´ usi-na
horse-ACC
tawtn´ uk.
medicine
I made the horse the medicine. (Rude, 1997, 73)
This small amountof overt agreementprovidessome independentreason to postulate
object agreement in Sahaptin, as in Nez Perce; v agrees with the object nominal.
Again as in Nez Perce, the object agreement features are passed from v to the subject
nominal, and thus once this nominal has participated in subject agreement, it has
access to both [f-T] and [f-v] features. The crucial difference is that in Sahaptin it
matters exactly what the features inherited from the object via object agreement are.
The ergative case marker is inserted only if the object features are 1st or 2nd person.
This means we can give a vocabulary item for the Sahaptin ergative as follows:
(86) Vocabulary Item for Sahaptin ergative case marker:
[3sg-T], [+participant-v]
Phonology: /n1m/
Here [+participant] may be taken as a feature that subsumes 1st and 2nd person, as in
Harley and Ritter (2002); or (86) may be taken as an abbreviation for two vocabulary
items, one in terms of a referential feature [1st] and one in terms of a referential
feature [2nd], in line with the proposal by Kratzer (to appear).
7 Conclusions
The investigation in this paper leads to conclusions for both the study of ergativity in
Nez Perce and the general study of morphological ergativity.
On the former count, we have seen that an adequate theory of case, caselessness
and especially ergativity in Nez Perce must be closely concerned with agreement of
both object and subject. The transitive subject, the category widely acknowledged to
be the target of ergative case, cannot be reduced to (transitive) agent, nor to the sub-
ject of a clause containinga theme or goal argument;it must instead be understoodas
the agreeing subject of a clause with an agreeing object. To see this, we have delved
deeply into the origins of caselessness in Nez Perce, concludingthat caseless clauses
are heterogeneous syntactically and semantically. One class of caseless clauses re-
quires an antipassive analysis. Objects in this type of clause are property-denoting42
NPs, not referential DPs; due to its ”smallness”, the antipassive object cannot agree,
and accordingly does not bear case. By contrast, extended reﬂexive objects are full,
referential DPs. However, agreement in such clauses has to target a bound variable
possessor which lacks f-features. Similarly to Italian, Nez Perce responds to the
difﬁculties of such agreement by simply showing no object agreement in extended
reﬂexive clauses. Concomitantly, ergative case-marking is not possible.
We saw further that in order to incorporate object agreement into a formalization
of the category of transitive subject, we must formalize ‘subject’ in a way that makes
reference to subject agreement. Failing this we will make the wrong predictions in
causatives. This deﬁnition of subject allows us to view the transitive subject as that
category uniquely positioned to receive agreement information from both high (T)
and low (v) sources, shedding light on its special treatment across languages. Our
analysis in terms of morphologicalcase allowed us to capture the dependencyof case
on syntactic factors by linking it to agreement processes that operate over syntactic
structures. It allowed us to pursue an analysis of ergative as a kind of portmanteau
spell-out of subject agreement and object agreement in combination with a nominal,
allowing us to dissolve Nez Perce ergativity into a combination of independently
motivated pieces of grammar.
Extending the study beyond the Nez Perce facts, we saw how the present view
might account for the dependency of ergative case on object person in Sahaptin.60
How widely the precise analysis offered for these languages may be extended in
pursuit of a universal theory of ergativity will depend on how syntactically and mor-
phologicallyuniﬁed “ergativelanguages”are. Comparativeworkon ergativitybegins
in earnest once we have established the ways in which languages do and do not make
use of identical means in singling out transitive subjects. Where the relevant criteria
of subjecthood and transitivity in Nez Perce concern participation in the syntactic
process of agreement, it is clearly logically possible that other languages may sub-
stitute alternative criteria. Yet it is also possible that languages might make use of
the Nez Perce system without wearing it on their sleeve, for instance by coupling
the case-agreement connection with a general reluctance to spell out one or the other
end of the relation. We saw in the discussion of causatives that Nez Perce agree-
ment is not spelled out under certain conditions; a language with ergative case but
no morphological object agreement could be analyzed as a more consistent system
along these lines. Where in Nez Perce a morphological agreement system makes the
case for case as agreement, in languages with no visible agreement systems we need
to look for independent clues of the role of agreement in determining case patterns.
The discussion of anaphor agreement effects suggests that such effects might serve
as a promising laboratory for the diagnosis of syntactic agreement that goes without
general morphological expression.
60 The analysis is also extended to Warlpiri in Deal (2008a).43
Appendix: Reﬂexives
The typical reﬂexive construction in Nez Perce involves a reﬂexive preﬁx that re-
places subject and object agreement preﬁxes.
(87) a. ’e-t´ ewyek-se.
3OBJ-feel-IMPERF
I feel it, I sense it.
b. ta’c
good
’in´ ee-tewyek-se.
1SG.REFL-feel-IMPERF
I feel good.
(88) a. p´ ee-yyew-ne.
3/3-pity-PERF
Hei pitied himj.
b. ’ipn´ ee-yyew-ne.
3SG.REFL-pity-PERF
He pitied himself.
Woolford(1999,267)analyzestheNezPercereﬂexivemarkersasa”aspecialanaphoric
form of agreement” that obtains when a probe agrees with an anaphor. If this were
so, we would expect reﬂexive preﬁxes to show up in extended reﬂexives, if indeed
object agreement targets an anaphor in such cases. I will show brieﬂy that this is not
the correct analysis of reﬂexive preﬁxes, and that their absence in extended reﬂexives
is not a problem for my analysis.
Reﬂexive morphology in Nez Perce is derivational. Unlike object agreement for
person and number, reﬂexive preﬁxes are found in nominalizations:
(89) a. ’inaa-tamapayk-t
1SG.REFL-report.on-PART
testimony (of myself)
b. ’ipn´ ee-ku-t’es
3SG.REFL-get.water-PART
cup, mug
c. ’ipnee-wle-ke’yk-e’´ ı
3SG.REFL-run-go-NMLZR
car
Reﬂexive morphology also sometimes combines with verbs in non-compositional
ways,bothinformingidioms(specialmeaningsgivenindependentlymotivatedparts)
andin changingargumentstructure.An exampleofthe formeris the reﬂexiveformof
the verb hinaq’i ‘to ﬁnish, complete’, which means ‘to prepare, to get ready’ (Aoki,
1994, 137) .
(90) ’´ aayat
woman
’ipn´ aa-hiinaq’i-s.
3REFL-ﬁnish-PCT
The woman is ready.
Comment: ”She’s all set, prepared from head to toe, ready to go out”
(91) ’´ aayat-om
woman-ERG
p´ aa-hinaq’i-s
3/3-ﬁnish-PCT
haacwal-a.
boy-OBJ
The woman ﬁnished (with) the boy.
NOT: The woman got the boy ready.
Comment: ”She’s ﬁnished with that guy.”44
An example of the reﬂexive changing the argument structure of a verb concerns the
verb kuu ‘get water’. This verb is only intransitive (unergative). However, the reﬂex-
ive combines with the bare verb to give the meaning ‘drink’.
(92) teqe-k´ uu-se.
quickly-get.water-IMPERF
I am going to get water brieﬂy. (Aoki, 1994, 249)
(93) ’in´ ee-kuu-se.
1SG.REFL-?-IMPERF
I am drinking.
If the reﬂexive preﬁx in a case like (93) were a special form of agreement marking
an anaphor object, we would need to posit a transitive verb root kuu with which the
reﬂexivecombinesandof whichthe anaphoris the object.Yet this transitiveverbroot
is not otherwise attested, and indeed, it is not clear what it would mean. The simpler
analysis is that this is a case where derivational morphology has fused to a verb stem
to the point where compositional analysis is no longer possible. Such fusion does
not target the inﬂectional morphology of Nez Perce, such as the subject and object
agreement markers shown in Table 2. For this reason, it does not seem plausible that
reﬂexive preﬁxes in Nez Perce are a form of object agreement.
I analyze the reﬂexive preﬁxes as derivational, detransitivizing morphology. In a
case where the reﬂexive does combine compositionally with independent material, it
combineswithanunsaturatedpredicateandintersectsitwitha predicatethatprovides
a theta-role to the subject, i.e. v. This is shown in the following tree, provided with
step-by-step semantic interpretations, for the Nez Perce equivalent of ‘Coyote pitied
himself’. The overall vP is a property of an events that holds of an event of pitying
Coyote whose agent is Coyote–i.e. an event of self-pitying by Coyote.61
(94) le.pitying(Coyote)(e) & agent(Coyote)(e)
Coyote lxle.pitying(x)(e) & agent(x)(e)
v
lxle.agent(x)(e)
lQlxle.pitying(x)(e) & Q(x)(e)
REFL
lPlQlxle.P(x)(e) & Q(x)(e)
V
lyle.pitying(y)(e)
The reﬂexive preﬁxes are not found in extended reﬂexives because in these cases
there is nodetransitivization(in the sense of unsaturatedargumentpositionsavailable
to REFL). In the standardcase the objectsaturates the object positionof the verb;this
61 The denotation given for REFL is simply a function which intersects the meaning of the verb with the
meaning of v. We might wonder if we could do without any REFL morpheme in the syntax and have the
reﬂexive morphology just spell-out the intersective mode of composition between the verb root and the v
head (on the spell-out of modes of composition, see Chung and Ladusaw 2004); I am not sure how such
an analysis would be able to deal with cases like (93).45
position cannot be bound off by REFL. If the possessor could move to the speciﬁer
of APPL, this position could not be bound off by REFL; it would be saturated by
the possessor. In this way, the detransitivizing semantics of the reﬂexive morpheme
prohibit its application to the extended reﬂexive construction.
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